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Citizens benefit from essential infrastructure like hazardous waste disposal
facilities, but they do not want such facilities to be located in their own
neighborhood. Local zoning allows communities to keep waste facilities out;
as a result, siting them has proven increasingly difficult. Due to the continued
need for such infrastructure, states have tried, often unsuccessfully, to combat
NIMB Yism through preemption of local zoning. In 1981, Massachusetts adopted
a siting law designed to use negotiated compensation as a means to overcome
the NIMBY phenomenon. Private developers were to bargain freely with
communities to establish terms for accepting a facility. The law's subsequent
failure to lead to any new disposal sites does not disqualify negotiation as a
realistic means of solving or alleviating NIMBYism. In fact, the law's ten year
history provides vital insight into the obstacles that prevent parties from
successfully negotiating their way around NIMBYism. Wheeler argues that,
suitably reformed, the Massachusetts law offers a model way forward for
planners and policymakers.
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Introduction
In 1980, Massachusetts adopted an innovative new law to end costly "Not
In My Back Yard" ("NIMBY") deadlocks over siting hazardous waste treatment
plants. To induce municipalities to accept much-needed treatment plants, the
Massachusetts siting law offered host communities compensation. Under the
law, the amount and form of compensation was to be decided through a
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structured process involving negotiations between the community and the
developer. The hope was simple: cities and towns would drop local zoning and
regulatory barriers to treatment plants-plants they had always bitterly
fought-for a price. Despite its conceptual promise, the Massachusetts law
failed in practice to break even a single siting deadlock. This Article argues that
the Massachusetts law failed because of the specific way in which it structured
compensation negotiation, and not because of the use of negotiation per se. The
Massachusetts example should not lead legislators to reject negotiation and
compensation schemes; it does, however, provide important caveats for future
attempts to find a way out of the NIMBY dilemma through negotiation and host
community compensation.
Local opposition to the siting of hazardous waste treatment plants is a
specific example of a much larger NIMBY phenomenon. Across the country,
citizens who implore elected officials to get tough with crime nevertheless
block construction of new prisons in their municipalities. Commuters frustrated
with rush-hour traffic lobby for highway expansion-but never through their
neighborhoods. Local defiance of projects whose value is widely recognized
has become so frequent-and so effective-that "NIMBY" is now standard
usage in our political vocabulary. NIMBY problems may arise at both the
neighborhood and regional level. But not all opposition to public projects
should be classified under the rubric of NIMBYism. There is no problem when
citizen groups block costly and dangerous projects that have dubious benefits.
in true NIMBY cases, on the other hand, communities affirm the need for a
variety of essential public works, but they want it in someone else's back yard.
As a result of the NIMBY problem, if essential facilities do get built, it is only
after a long and expensive delay.
As an attempt to overcome the costs of NIMBYism, the Massachusetts
siting law was potentially of great significance. If hazardous waste disputes
could be resolved through negotiation, then surely other NIMBY deadlocks
could be broken as well. Negotiation might solve the troublesome, multi-party
prisoner's dilemma that NIMBYism represents. The Massachusetts law broke
new ground by integrating two strategies that were then just emerging in
environmental policy-making and regulation: it employed a market mechanism
to deal with a problem that had defied standard command-and-control solutions,
and it stipulated mediation and arbitration in lieu of the conventional recourse
to litigation. The law structured a negotiation scheme in which a targeted
community would negotiate for compensation, in any form, with the interested
developer. If negotiations failed, state-authorized mediators would intervene;
"final and binding" arbitration would occur if mediation failed, with very
limited rights of legal appeal. The process established by the statute was both
visible and highly participatory, and it was aimed at reaching concrete results
in specific target communities. The novelty of the negotiation approach drew
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national attention. Several other states enacted their own versions of the
legislation.'
The Massachusetts statute was a conspicuous failure in all seven towns
where its negotiation procedure was followed. After a dozen years and tens of
millions of dollars spent by state officials, facility developers, and local
communities, not one negotiation has succeeded and not a single arbitration
hearing has been held. Ironically, the new law became a focal point for
community resistance. Residents looked with suspicion at proposed economic
incentives and, notwithstanding the threat of adverse arbitration, spumed all
offers of compensation. With understandable frustration, Massachusetts
environmental officials ultimately urged repeal of the law.
A plausible conclusion to draw from the Massachusetts experience is that
there was no bargaining overlap: the maximum in incentives that treatment
facility developers could offer was lower than the minimum amount
communities were willing to accept to cover perceived costs. While gaps
between bargaining positions may occur, this Article argues that there is still
hope for negotiation. Negotiation is more than mere economic exchange. At
its best, it is a process by which participants give voice to their concerns, define
and express their identities, learn about possibilities, and sometimes even
reassess their values. The design of the Massachusetts siting process ignored
these dimensions of negotiation, which in large part explains its failure.
Part I of this Article examines the origins of NIMBYism and possible
strategies for overcoming it. Part II details the problem of hazardous waste
facility siting in Massachusetts, the failure of the siting law, and its legislative
aftermath. Part III, considers how the various stages of the Massachusetts
negotiation process exacerbated adversarial behavior and examines basic
conceptual flaws in its design. Part IV argues that alternative models of
negotiation may still resolve NIMBY conflicts. Finally, a brief conclusion
suggests areas for further research on NIMBYism and negotiation.
I. The Nature of NIMBYism
A. The NIMB Y Debate
Private developers and public officials in charge of siting regional
infrastructure are predictably critical of the NIMBY phenomenon, but some
prominent environmentalists are also distressed by the consequences of local
opposition. While lobbying for substantial cuts in waste production, many state
and national environmental organizations have also pushed hard for modem
recycling and treatment plants; waste plants like those sought in Massachusetts




are intended to reduce soil and ground water pollution. Observers have
attempted to understand the NIMBY phenomenon by looking at two potential
causes: narrow parochialism and problems of political legitimacy.
1. Parochialism and the NIMBY Phenomenon
When it comes to siting waste. facilities, the apparent solution to one set
of environmental problems may generate another.
If new hazardous waste facilities and landfills cannot be sited, the
waste must still go somewhere: to existing, increasingly expensive,
and overburdened sites.., or sometimes to organized-crime fronts,
midnight dumpers, or the kind of company that has a driver open the
stopcock and drop waste along two hundred miles of rural roads
across a dozen counties (a real case in 1978 in North Carolina). And
ships and barges full of waste will continue to wander the nation's
and the world's waters, looking for places- some legal, others
not-to disgorge their cargoes.'
Some local opposition to waste treatment facilities has been well justified, but
commentators have pointed to cases in which "the blockage demonstrates a
local selfishness and environmental smugness triumphant over broader national
values."3 The local focus of NIMBYism has been condemned as unjustifiably
parochial.4 National and regional environmental organizations sometimes find
themselves in the awkward position of attacking grassroots NIMBY groups for
irresponsible buck-passing.5
In the eyes of many critics, NIMBYism thus seems like one more dis-
couraging example of rampant selfishness in our society, a single-minded
pursuit of parochial interests without regard for the greater good.
Communitarians would tell us that the core problem is one of values: we need
a new ethic of personal and public decision making that couples individual
2. Frank J. Popper, LULUs and their Blockage, in CONFRONTING REGIONAL CHALLENGES: APPROACHES TO
LULUs, GROWTH, AND OTHER VEXING GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS 13, 19 (Joseph Dimento & LeRoy Graymeyer
eds., 1991). Popper coined the term "LULUs"-..locally unwanted land uses."
3. Id. at 19.
4. "it looks at me, myself and mine. We're losing a sense of community responsibility. There are
certain things we generate-waste, traffic and so on-and we have a collective responsibility to deal with
these things." CHARLES PILLER, THE FAIL-SAFE SOCIETY: COMMUNITY DEFIANCE AND THE END OF AMERICAN
TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIMISM 159-60 (1991) (quoting Ray Brady, an analyst with the Association of Bay Area
Governments in San Francisco).
5. PILLER, supra note 4, at 165-72.
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rights and social responsibilities.6 The critics insist that home rule must be
exercised in a way that is regionally responsible.
2. Political Legitimacy
Other observers are sympathetic to NIMBYism, seeing it as a manifestation
of a growing and justifiable distrust of business and government. Daniel
Mazmanian and Michael Stanley-Jones warn that:
America appears to be facing a profound crisis of political legitimacy
that reaches from the local up through the national level of
government. Opposition to LULUs stems often from narrow self-
interest or differing perspectives and viewpoints; but possibly most
profoundly it stems from a public that does not trust its leaders to
make wise decisions.7
They contend that the problem goes much "deeper than the need to educate the
public better, or to negotiate, or to buy off opposition" through compensation.!
Local opponents are often suspicious of the procedures by which siting
decisions are made, even when public participation is legally required. For
example, the Citizens' Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste defines a public
hearing as "an event where the public speaks and the officials don't listen."9
Local opponents harboring that attitude feel no need to play by rules that they
think are stacked against them. People who have "little or no faith in dominant
institutions" attack the rules themselves and "often try to disrupt official pro-
ceedings."'"
Political alienation can be particularly acute when public health issues seem
to be at stake. Some Love Canal residents went so far as to briefly kidnap two
federal officials in hopes of getting the government to respond to their
relocation demands. Charles Piller notes that "[c]orporate and government of-
ficials, scientists, and many environmentalists find this willful unreasonableness
chilling, largely because they cannot control or channel it."" He concludes:
"[S]ociety would do well to stop trying to 'solve the NIMBY problem' and to
begin exploring ways to make NIMBYism unnecessary. This will require a
6. Richard C. Collins, The NIMBY Phenomenon: Selfish Interest or a Means to Discussion?, THE
RESPONSIVE CoMMUNITY, Fall 1992,68,71 (reviewing Denis J. Brion, ESSENTIAL INDUSTRY AND THE NIMBY
PHENOMENON (1991)).
7. Daniel A. Mazmanian & Michael Stanley-Jones, ReconceivingLULUs: Changing the Nature and
Scope ofLoafly Umwed Lad Uses in CONFRONTING REGIONAL CHALLENGES: APPROACHES TO LULUs, GROWH,
AND OTHER VEXING GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS 55, 62 (Joseph Dimento & LeRoy Graymeyer eds., 1991).
8. Id.
9. PILLER, supra note 4, at 189.





radical reappraisal of the relationship between the public and the entire
scientific and technological enterprise."12
For some environmentalists, NIMBYism is not justifiable skepticism so
much as appropriate policy. NIMBY deadlocks wisely spell a collective
BANANA-"build absolutely nothing, anywhere near anything"-or even more
strongly, NOPE-"not on planet earth." In this view, the costs of waste
treatment and disposal always exceed benefits. Alternative production
technologies and drastically different consumer habits are the only answers; to
say "yes" to a treatment facility is to countenance economic behavior that has
to be changed. Siting issues are always non-negotiable. 3
Although the substance of these various assessments of NIMBYism differs,
their implications seem consistently bleak. If, on the one hand, NIMBYism
stems from fundamental parochialism and selfishness, then fervent pleas for
good samaritanism and community sacrifice will fall on deaf ears. If, on the
other hand, the real problem is political legitimacy, municipalities will cynically
construe the best-intended efforts of the state. Meanwhile, hazardous waste piles
up.
B. The Roots of NIMBYism
1. The Economics of Opposition
For proponents convinced of the need for waste treatment plants and other
facilities, and frustrated with the significant social cost of protracted deadlock,
local opposition may seem irrational. It is not. Regional recycling and waste
treatment facilities generate costs as well as benefits. Strict adherence to
government regulations and the best industry practices can reduce, but not
eliminate, environmental and public health risks. Dangerous materials must be
transported, treated, and stored. The mere presence of such materials may also
require expensive monitoring and safety equipment even if no accidents occur.
Such costs may be substantially out-weighed by social benefits both to the
environment, in terms of diminished pollution, and to the regional economy,
in terms of maintaining the tax base and preserving industrial jobs. However,
12. Id. at 195.
13. Richard Gimello, former director of New Jersey's siting commission, disparages those who would
justify their local obstructionism as an indirect way of forcing a "zero-discharge"policy: "People are mixing
tactics with policy. When you stop up a toilet, the need to go to the bathroom doesn't go away." PILLER,
supra note 4, at 171.
By contrast, considerthe following observation:"Should hazardous-wastedisposal problems be viewed
conventionally as the unavoidable by-product of ever-expanding industrial production, then the invariable
answer is a call for more and more waste-disposal sites. Or simply to send the wastes elsewhere. Alter-
natively, should it be framed in terms of the physical limits of the earth's surface to absorb and assimilate
hazardous materials or the threat to human health, the past approach of adding landfills and waste facilities
will only lead to an eventual policy disaster." MAZMANIAN & STANLEY-JONES, supra note 7, at 56.
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the costs and benefits of centralized treatment facilities will necessarily be
distributed unequally.
People who think a new facility will leave them much worse off than
they would be without it are strongly induced to take action against
it; people who each have a little bit to gain from its completion are
only weakly motivated to support it. When the losers are few in
number and known to each other, they also have the ability to act,
while a large number of beneficiaries cannot easily organize
themselves to take action. . . . In many cases, therefore, organized
local opposition can be expected to prevail independent of the value
of the project. The only practical response to this structural "tilt" in
favor of local opposition power is to change local motivation to
oppose.1"
It is possible that a careful assessment of certain treatment facilities might
actually indicate a net reduction of health and environmental risks, particularly
if construction of a plant were linked to the clean-up of a previously
contaminated site. A carefully monitored plant might pose less risk than the
prospect of continued illegal dumping. Typically, however, local residents are
skeptical, even hostile, toward such safety claims. Public information campaigns
to overcome NIMBY fears have been largely ineffectual. Starting in the 1970s,
widespread publicity about hazardous waste problems at Love Canal and other
industrial sites heightened fear of health impacts and seriously undermined the
credibility of business and government."
Even if local citizens can be persuaded of a project's relative safety,
however, they are likely to remain concerned about other people's mispercep-
tions. Homeowners may not trust the real estate market to reflect the true risks
of a neighboring treatment plant. Citizens may not wish to be thought of as
living in the region's dump.
In short, the arrival of a new treatment plant will almost inevitably impose
real and perceived costs on its host community: health and environmental risks,
added municipal services, and possible loss of property and reputational value.
The magnitude of such costs may vary markedly with both the type of facility
and the setting in which it operates, but there should be little question about
the existence of such costs.
14. MICHAEL O'HARE ET AL., FACILITY SITING AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION 70 (1983).
15. Parts of the New York town of Love Canal had been built on top of a dump containing 22,000
tons of waste chemicals. In 1978 President Carter had declared it a federal disaster area; eventually the
government relocated 2500 people and razed a school and 237 homes. See PILLER, supra note 4, at 7.
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Far from finding the participants irrational, we are struck by the
consistency with which parties in siting disputes act rationally and ef-
fectively to serve their interests as they perceive them. Thus, we think
the failure of our conventional facility siting process lies in a
decision-making and interest-balancing structure that frustrates the
desires of the participants to cooperate or compete constructively,
rather than in any defect in the intelligence or the character of the
participants. 6
When every community acts in its self-interest to avoid costs, there may
be no place for facilities that would serve the regional welfare. Viewed in the
aggregate, such actions have the paradoxical quality of a multi-person prisoners
dilemma: the sum of rational individual decisions can produce an outcome that
leaves everyone worse off.
2. The Tradition of Local Autonomy
In many respects, NIMBYism represents a predictable outcome of the
American tradition of vesting land use control at the municipal level. With the
power to determine what can and cannot be built within their boundaries, local
boards typically zone out costly uses and promote beneficial ones. Multi-family
housing is discouraged, in part, because it brings significant social service costs
in the form of schools, fire and police protection. By contrast, research and
development parks contribute to the local treasury without the demands of
costly residential services. Local zoning has also been used to regulate noxious
and risky land uses so as to avoid the unwanted imposition of safety, health and
environmental costs on property owners.
If land use control were managed at a regional or state level, the NIMBY
problem would be significantly recast. Local residents might still oppose the
placement of a proposed facility, but lacking legal recourse, they would have
to rely on their political clout and savvy to avoid its costs. A more centralized
system of land use regulation conceivably could be established in the United
States without encountering constitutional obstacles. Municipal power to zone
derives from the police power of the state. The range of zoning options
available to communities generally depends on the type of enabling legislation
passed by state governments. Theoretically, a state could withdraw powers it
had previously chosen to delegate to its cities and towns.'7 The Supreme
Court's landmark opinion, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' which broadly upheld
16. O'HARE ET AL., supra note 14, at 2-3.
17. Even in states which have granted some measure of "home rule" to municipalities, the
municipalities' autonomy is typically constrained when matters of broader concern are at stake.
18. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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zoning, acknowledged "the possibility of cases where the general public interest
would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality
would not be allowed to stand in the way." 9
Courts subsequently have made little of this dicta, however, and the
Supreme Court in particular has gone to great lengths to avoid involvement in
local-regional battles. In Warth v. Selden,2 ° for example, the Court declined to
hear on standing'grounds the substance of a claim that the snob-zoning practices
of an affluent suburb of Rochester, New York were unfairly burdening the
central city.2 Regionalization is thus permissible though not constitutionally
compelled.
State courts, for the most part, have been equally reluctant to strip
communities of what they regard as their zoning prerogatives. An instructive
exception to this judicial attitude is the Southern Burlington County NAACP
v. Mt. Laurel" decision in which the New Jersey Supreme Court imposed on
municipalities an affirmative obligation to accommodate a "fair share" of the
regional demand for affordable housing.23 In essence, the court reasoned that
because a municipality's power to zone derives from the police power of the
state, and because that power, in turn, is grounded in the general welfare, local
zoning must be exercised so as to promote the general welfare-not merely the
parochial interests of one community."
Though not binding on other jurisdictions, of course, the logic of Mt.
Laurel could apply to any NIMBY problem. Most courts, however, have
declined to construe their state constitutions and enabling acts in this way,
deferring instead to their legislatures on these issues.
C. Strategies to Overcome NIMBYism
Three broad regulatory strategies have been employed to combat
NIMBYism: state preemption of municipal authority, compensation awards, and
negotiation.
1. State Preemption of Municipal Authority
The clash between local control and broader state welfare is a central
dilemma for contemporary land use policy and regulation. This policy gridlock
is caused by a difference in scale between local government institutions and
contemporary land use issues. Regional institutions have been used with varying
19. Id at 390.
20. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
21. Id. at 518.
22. 366 A.2d 713 (1975).
23. Id. at 724.
24. Id. at 725.
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degrees of success to counteract this problem. Metropolitan transit systems,
regional water and sewer agencies, and more recently, special air quality
districts can all be seen as devices intended to match institutional reach to the
scale of particular environmental or social problems.
Many NIMBY issues, however, are not easily addressed through this kind
of regionalization. When infrastructure is located in only a few sites, the
apparent absence of common benefits and burdens makes it far more difficult
to forge a sense of common regional identity and responsibility. Some states
have tried, usually unsuccessfuly, to deal with such cases on a site-specific
basis, either through preemptory legislation or eminent domain actions.23 Munic-
ipalities, however, typically have many environmental and safety regulations
in addition to zoning that determined opponents can use to tie up seemingly
minor permit requests in prolonged administrative battles.26 Local residents can
also use state environmental impact assessment procedures to forestall project
approval. If those tactics fail, lawsuits and political lobbying remain options. 7
In extreme cases, opponents may resort to civil disobedience and violence.28
Massachusetts enacted its siting law in large part because its attempts to
preempt local control had been thwarted by lawsuits, political demonstrations,
and special bills to protect targeted communities.29
2. Compensation Awards
Conceding the practical realities of local political power, some
policymakers have approached siting stalemates as a problem of market failure
in which communities bearing the immediate costs of hosting a facility are
unable to share in its more broadly distributed benefits. If the NIMBY problem
25. See Lawrence S. Bacow & James R. Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste
Facilities: The MassachusettsApproach, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 270-75 (1982).
26. Id. at 273.
27. Id. at 274
28. In Michigan, local residents put nails and tacks on the highways in order to
prevent the state from burying cattle contaminated by polybrominated
biphenyls. In otherjurisdictions, residents have threatened to dynamite existing
facilities, and have taken public officials hostage to vent their anger over
policymaking processes that failed to adequately address their concerns.
Id. (citations omitted).
29. In Massachusetts, the siting legislation was motivated by a flurry of activity that
followed the leak of an executive agency study of possible waste-disposal sites.
Two of the sites were in the districts of powerful legislators, who succeeded
in getting laws enacted that forbade the construction of any hazardous waste
facilities in those locations. Shortly thereafter, the legislature realized that it had
probably created a dangerous precedent: as proposed site communities
sequentially demanded similar exclusion, a necessary kind of industrial
infrastructure might never be built.
Michael O'Hare & Debra Sanderson, Facility Siting and Compensation: Lessons from the Massachusetts
Experience 12 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMNT. 364, 365-66 (1993).
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is thus redefined, compensation to the facility's neighbors becomes a way of
breaking the impasse.
Compensation is not an entirely new response, either in theory or in
practice. It has long been an element of neo-classical economic analysis. Indeed,
the Kaldor-Hicks test defines a policy as efficient if beneficiaries still favor it'
after fully compensating those disadvantaged by its implementation."
A city or town predisposed to fight a waste treatment plant might actively
seek one if the developer were obliged to provide sufficient compensation. This
compensation would presumably be funded by the treatment fees from plant
users throughout the state. Charging consumer fees that properly capture all
external environmental and health costs of a facility could overcome market
failure. In effect, the plant operator would become a surrogate for the millions
benefitting from its opening but who, as noted above, would be hard to identify
and impossible to convene.3'
By fully internalizing social costs, compensation has the added theoretical
virtue of promoting efficiency. 2 Profit-maximizing operators would have an
incentive to seek sites where adverse impacts and hence compensation awards
would be minimal. Moreover, compensation awards might mollify some
potential opponents. Just as the prospect of an increased tax base and new jobs
can build a local constituency for conventional development, the opportunity
to win compensation could spawn local support for a controversial project.33
In the case of a controversial waste facility, there may be heated debate
about how much compensation its neighbors must be paid. While steadfast
facility opponents may believe that public health and environmental hazards
are beyond pecuniary recompense, some states have experimented with
compensating municipalities, although payments have been typically limited
either by formula or to direct costs.3" Where mandated compensation has been
tried, however, it has at best moderated NIMBYism but not overcome it.
30. See EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 279-80 (1978). In the
planning field, this test has been advanced by Donald Hagman. DONALD HAGMAN, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS:
LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 5 (1978).
31. In some respects, this notion of compensation is not all that different from infrastructure charges,
betterment fees, and other kinds of special assessments that developers must often pay municipalities. Even
with general property taxes, there is some relationship between what owners pay the municipality and the
demands they place upon it.
32. See generally RICHARD B. STEWART & JAMES E. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 103-07 (2d
ed. 1978).
33. The NIMBY dynamic may be played out within a municipality, becausethe particular neighborhood
hosting the facility would bear most of the costs, while the rest of the community would share in the
compensation. Municipialities may also divide into factions, dependingon the adequacy of the award.





The Massachusetts siting strategy-described more fully in the next part
of the Article 35-added the significant step of allowing developers and
communities to negotiate compensation. Instead of establishing a fixed award
or formula, the Massachusetts statute directed affected parties to negotiate the
amount and form of payment.3 6 One community might insist on a fund dedicat-
ed to environmental monitoring and mitigation; another might seek a more
open-ended block grant.
The political symbolism of letting a municipality decide what constitutes
acceptable compensation represents a clear departure from regulatory regimes
under which the state merely awards damages to a community chosen to host
a facility. Negotiating special compensation packages also offers greater
efficiency than does using one-size-fits-all formulas. Proposals not yielding
enough compensation to satisfy a community are socially inefficient and should
not be built, at least not in the sites proposed.37
The notion that siting disputes could be negotiated was an imaginative and
propitious break with earlier attempts to dictate where LULUs (locally
unwanted land uses) 38 should go. In Massachusetts, negotiation appealed to
pragmatists eager for any alternative to the "decide-announce-and-defend
' 39
character of traditional preemptive approaches. It was also supported by those
advocating community empowerment. Negotiated compensation, moreover, was
in harmony with a growing interest in environmental dispute resolution in a
variety of other settings. It emerged alongside negotiated rule-making, joint
fact-finding in impact assessment, and the mediation of lawsuits over grant-
making and permitting.40
Some NIMBY observers, however, are skeptical about whether the
contentious cases really can be negotiated. Perhaps "we are dealing here with
deep psychological and social attitudes that may well prove impervious to
negotiation, mediation, and incentive strategies."'" For critics of negotiation,
35. See infra pp. 255-64.
36. "The amount and type of compensation to be paid cannot be determined by a technical analysis,
but should be negotiated between the developer and the community in an environment of informed debate
and interaction." O'Hare & Sanderson, supra note 29, at 366.
37. Such projects are "turkeys" or "nonstarters" in O'Hare and Sanderson's lexicon. Id. at 364-65.
38. See supra note 2.
39. Dennis Ducsik has been credited with this crisp description of the traditional siting approach which
is now commonplace in NIMBY literature. O'HARE ET AL., supra note 14, at 6 (crediting Dennis Ducsik,
Electricity Planning and the Environment: Toward a New Role for Government in the Decision Process
(1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)).
40. See, LAWRENCE BACOW & MICHAEL WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1983); GAIL
BINGHAM REsoImo Bv ,vNmcmrAL DISPUTES: A DE CA OF EmPEENCE (1984- LAWREIE SuSSKIRD & JEaVREY
CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE (1988).
41. LAWRENCE MANN, WHEN NIMBYs ARE REALLY ABOUT "DIFFERENt" PEOPLE I (Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy, 1992). Mann made his observation in the particular context of siting social service facilities.
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the best solution is to document carefully a controversial project's alleged
impacts, and let higher legislative and judicial tribunals decide if overall
benefits exceed costs. Neighbors might be awarded compensation, but would
not be able to defeat the project.
The failure of the Massachusetts process to site even one waste facility
would seem to support the skepticism of these critics. Indeed, two policy
analysts who contributed significantly to the drafting of the Massachusetts
statute have come to a similarly discouraging conclusion: "The NIMBY
problem is, at heart, symptomatic of the pessimistic expectations that citizens,
industry, and government all hold of each other and themselves; raising those
expectations is not a task that can be accomplished by any legislated decision
process."42
Does the Massachusetts experience reveal that no zone of negotiated
agreement exists? Perhaps the developers were unable to offer enough to
satisfy their opposition. If that occurred, economists might infer that perceived
costs outweighed benefits, so that the reservation price of neighbors was higher
than that of plant operators.43
This interpretation cannot be conclusively disproved, but this Article argues
that such a reading is superficial. First, the existence of a bargaining overlap
does not necessarily mean that parties will be able to find it. Transaction costs
can prevent buyers and sellers from reaching agreements. The Massachusetts
siting law may not have eliminated all the causes of market failure. Second,
strategic behavior can stymie mutually beneficial agreement. A party may use
commitment tactics that lock it into an unrealistic position. Alternatively, a
party may present unreasonably high demands, hoping the other side will "blink
first"; meanwhile, the costs of prolonged talks can exhaust the potential for
joint gains. Third, as an intensely interpersonal process, negotiation is
vulnerable to poor communication, cognitive biases, and raw emotion;
agreement may elude people just because they cannot see it." In short, this
Article asserts that the problem in Massachusetts may not have been with siting
negotiation per se, but with the particular way it was conceived and
implemented under the statute.
42. O'Hare & Sanderson, supra note 29, at 375.
43. One economic corollary might be that Massachusetts residents are more hostile to hazardous waste
than are people elsewhere. Massachusetts residents should then be willing to pay to export their waste to
states whose citizens are more tolerant.
44. Robert Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict,




II. Massachusetts' Efforts to Overcome NIMBYism
A. The NIMBY Problem in Massachusetts
By the end of the 1970s, the perceived need for state-of-the-art treatment
plants was acute both in Massachusetts and elsewhere. Stricter federal and state
regulations in the 1970s had radically reduced the number of licensed landfills
and waste plants and had also imposed expensive operating conditions on those
that remained open. With limited disposal and treatment options locally,
Massachusetts industry bore the increasingly heavy costs of out-of-state
shipment. Furthermore, environmentalists were learning that as the costs of
waste treatment multiplied, the incentive for midnight dumping also rose. Media
reports of illegal disposals poisoning municipal well water in suburban Boston
pushed responsible waste treatment policy to the top of the state's environmen-
tal agenda.45
There was broad agreement that Massachusetts needed several modem
waste facilities that were large enough to capture economies of scale. While
environmentalists lobbied to require new manufacturing processes and materials
that would be less hazardous, most people recognized that even if waste
problems were tackled aggressively from the production end, a significant
amount of toxic residuals would still require treatment. For example, the same
computer industry that was prized for creating jobs and for underpinning the
tax base of many Massachusetts cities and towns also used dangerous solvents
to clean its chips. Few firms could efficiently treat all the waste generated on
site. Treatment was also required for hazardous waste in old dumps and
abandoned industrial areas.
Notwithstanding this unusual consensus between environmentalists,
business people, and state officials, efforts to build new treatment plants were
repeatedly thwarted at the municipal level. Local residents, afraid for their
health and safety, were unmoved by pleas for the greater good and used
municipal zoning and environmental lawsuits to kill planned treatment facilities.
Like many other states, Massachusetts had the legal authority to preempt local
control, but lacked the political will to do so.46
State authorities saw advantage in characterizing the waste treatment
problem as one of market failure rather than local autonomy. While the net
social benefit of new waste facilities was expected to be substantial, the many
citizens who would benefit from the resulting environmental and job protection
had no direct way to bargain with those communities fearing adverse impacts.
With the NIMBY problem recast in economic terms, its apparent resolution lay
45. Bacow& Milkey, supra note 25, at 267; Diane Ripstein, Chemical Waste Beneath a Massachusetts
Town, Bus. & Soc'Y REV., Spring 1982, at 46, 47.
46. See O'Hare & Sanderson, supra note 29, at 365-66.
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in redistributing the general benefits of waste treatment to communities that
were potentially willing to bear the specific costs of hosting treatment facilities.
Compensation to neighbors of the project would be the key to breaking the
NIMBY impasse.
B. Design of the Massachusetts Siting Law
The authors of the siting statute saw their task as one of eliminating
barriers that had prevented waste facility developers and municipalities from
making deals on their own.
Parties to a siting dispute have good reasons to negotiate a deal, but
important obstacles must be overcome before they can do. so. These
obstacles can be removed, in many cases, by actions on the part of
one or another party, or by government in setting the rules of the
game.47
Industrial developers are often able to reach agreement with municipal
regulators and citizen groups even in the absence of formal negotiation rules.
In tightly regulated areas, developers may be required to scale down plans or
provide supporting roads and sewers. In other situations the local industrial
commission may provide financing and other assistance to lure new business.
In both instances, regulatory approvals may be tied to issues of infrastructure,
property taxes, and conditions of operation.
There were serious obstacles, however, to informal negotiation over the
siting of waste treatment facilities. Some problems involved the process of
negotiation. Who, for example, would represent the community at the
bargaining table? Without legislative authorization, a deal struck with one
agency might be attacked by another or by an ad hoc citizen group. Other
problems were substantive. Under existing land use law, for example, a
community could only require that direct impacts be mitigated. A demand for
compensation unrelated to a proposed plant's operation might constitute
regulatory extortion and invalidate local ordinances.48
To overcome these potential obstacles, the Massachusetts siting law
established a formal negotiation process that redefined substantive rights.
Working from a rigorous micro-economic conception of negotiation, the authors
of the statute created incentives designed to lead parties away from the
courthouse and toward the bargaining table. Parties were permitted to negotiate
compensation directly; the amount and form of payment would be determined
47. O'HARE ET AL., supra note 14, at 98.
48. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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in discussions over the design and operation of the proposed facility.49
Negotiations would be initiated by private, profit-seeking waste management
firms responding to the growing demand for their services. In a limited respect,
this reliance on market forces was a harbinger of other administrative reforms
enacted later in the 1980s. Yet the law represents neither "privatization" nor
"deregulation" in intent or substance. The authors of the law spoke of promot-
ing general welfare by breaking the siting stalemate-not of getting government
off the backs of business. ° Likewise, there was no talk of relaxing state or
federal environmental and safety standards; these would be fully enforced.5"
Instead the focus was on creating incentives for private industry and local
governments to strike mutually advantageous bargains.
The statute and accompanying regulations contained the following
provisions:
1. Preemption of local land use authority. Treatment facilities could not
be barred from industrial zones: a community could ban such plants only
by barring all industrial uses.52
2. Municipal authority to bargain for compensation, even in forms
wholly unrelated to a proposed plant.5 3 A community could insist upon a
new athletic facility or funds for its library; in other contexts, these
demands would be regarded as illegal exactions.54
3. Designation of local assessment committees as municipal
representatives, thus preventing disputes over who could speak for a
community in negotiations and bind a community to an agreement.55
4. Establishment of a fast-track time table, usually triggered by a
developer's filing a notice of intent to build a facility. 6
5. Creation of a state Site Safety Council to promote the building of
treatment plants. The Council was also designed to assess specific
proposals and monitor the conduct of negotiations."
6. ' Community technical assistance grants for assessment of the
environmental and other impacts of a proposed facility.5
49. See O'Hare & Sanderson, supra note 29, at 366.
50. O'Hare and Sandersonwere the principal drafters ofthe law. O'HARE ET AL., supranote 14, at 67-87.
51. Id.; Bacow & Milkey, supra note 25, at 284.
52. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 11, § 150B; ch. 21D, § 16 (West 1981).
53. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 9; ch. 21D, §§ 11-12 (West 1981).
54. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483.U.S. 825 (1987).
55. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21 D, § 5 (West 1981); MASS. REGS. CODEtit. 990, §§ 8.01-8.07(1982).
56. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 9 (West 1981).
57. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 4 (West 1981).
58. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § II (West 1981). MASS. REGS. CODEtit. 990, §§ 9.01-9.10 (1982).
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7. Mediation in cases where developers and local assessmentcommittees
were unable to agree.
59
8. "[F]inal and binding" arbitration were mediation to fail, with very
limited rights of appeal.6"
Collectively, these provisions legitimated and formalized negotiation. The
law also significantly recast municipal bargaining power. While diminishing
the ability of cities and towns to ban treatment plants outright, it greatly
expanded their opportunity to win compensation. Furthermore, the prospect of
mandatory arbitration in the event of a negotiation impasse was intended to
discourage unreasonable bargaining positions, as the statute gave arbitrators
wide discretion in fashioning remedies. Cities that turned down a developer's
offer might be forced by the threat of arbitration to accept a less generous
award. Likewise, a developer who refused the demands of a community would
run the risk of an arbitrator imposing even more stringent requirements.61
The sponsors also hoped that the statute would prompt communities to
compete for treatment plants. For example, if a facility proposed for City A
were to expose nearby City B to many of the same environmental risks and
traffic impacts, residents of City B might decide to counter-propose an
alternative site and compensation package.62 The statute also allowed developers
to invite communities to "bid" for projects by stating their compensation
requirements. Intercity competition would lead developers to locate facilities
where perceived costs were minimized, and thus improve the efficiency of
siting decisions.
In sum, the law defined who was to be at the bargaining table, what was
negotiable, and where the parties would stand if they were unable to make a
deal. Although these reforms relied primarily on market forces, the new Siting
Council was intended as a resource for plant operators looking for potential
sites, as well as for communities seeking guidance through the negotiation
process and help in assessing likely environmental impacts.63 Thus the state
would actively lubricate the market with both information and financial support.
59. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 13 (West 1981); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 990, § 11.02 (1982).
60. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 15 (West 1981). MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 990, §§ 13.01-13.06
(1982).
61. The symmetry is not perfect; a developercould always choose to abandon its proposal if arbitration
made it unprofitable.
62. Under the statute, abutting communities can be awarded compensation for direct costs, but these
are determined by the state and are not negotiated between the parties. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21 D, §
14 (West 1981).
63. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 4 (West 1981).
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C. A Decade of Experience
More than ten years have passed since enactment of the Massachusetts
Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act. Despite a decade of substantial public and
private effort to make the process work, not one treatment facility has been
sited in Massachusetts.
Seven proposals were initiated, and all but two drew heavy local opposition
from the outset." The availability of compensation did little to change the tone
and content of local debate; in fact, the suggestion of a "bribe" may have
exacerbated contention in certain cases. 5 In some communities project
proponents withdrew after realizing that negotiations were not progressing. In
other instances state environmental agencies, concerned about the safety of a
proposed facility, finally terminated the negotiations. There was not one siting
agreement reached between a developer and a municipality.
Most proposals sparked vehement opposition from the start. The city of
Haverhill brought suit against the Siting Council." The town of Warren tried
to defy the preemptive statute, invoking its own local ordinance that purported
to ban waste facilities, then found itself sued by neighboring Brimfield. 7 In
Gardner, the developer tried to mollify the community by agreeing to abide by
the results of a referendum only to see the community vote three-to-one against
the project.6"
Given the dubious reputations of several plant developers, some of this
opposition may have been inevitable. The company proposing a treatment
project in Haverhill invited some residents to visit its New Jersey facility; only
a few days later the facility suffered a serious explosion and fire.69 The would-
be developer in Warren antagonized local residents and state officials by
refusing to reveal what kinds of wastes it intended to treat.7° From the outset,
the law cast communities in a defensive posture, forcing them to cope with
unfamiliar regulations and to respond to proposals which they neither solicited
nor desired. Residents and officials in both Haverhill and Warren first learned
64. See DENIS J. BRION, ESSENTIAL INDUSTRY AND THE NIMBY PHENOMENON 7-14 (1991) (describing six
of these proposals and the reactions they drew); James L. Franklin, State May Lose $50m in Waste Cleanup
Funds, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 1991, at 24 (describing community reaction to siting proposal in Orange);
FMUE ScamEIDLER & PETER M SAmw,4 GErmnN To MAYBE. DEa_ s ON THE ROAD To NFLTIAThON IN HAzARD-
OUS WASTE SITING 278-88 (1988).
65. Some backlash in this regard was anticipated. As Bacow and Milkey note, "many people object
to the concept of putting a price on health or environmental amenities. These people believe that the
environment is to be valued for its own sake .... Bacow & Milkey, supra note 25, at 277 (footnote
omitted).
66. Id. at 302-03.
67. Id; SCHMEIDLER & SANDMAN, supra note 64, at 281.
68. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 25, at 302.
69. SCHMEIDLER & SANDMAN, supra note 64, at 280.
70. Id. at 281.
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that they had been targeted for hazardous waste facilities through press
conferences the developers held in Boston."
Several other cases were somewhat less contentious, at least at the outset,
yet similarly produced no siting agreement. A local civic group in Taunton
sponsored a forum on waste issues and built some support for the idea of
hosting a treatment facility. When a developer floated a specific proposal,
however, it was strongly opposed by local industries concerned that monitoring
of the new plant might mean stricter scrutiny for their existing activities. The
plan was scuttled before the formal process was ever initiated.72
Wary of these early failures, proponents of plants in Freetown and Orange
took.a different approach. Both developers pledged to pursue projects only in
communities that expressed some interest in hosting sites." Further, they would
not use the siting law to coerce municipalities into negotiations.74 These
promises leveled the bargaining table to some extent and mobilized advocates
of local economic development. Once again, however, doubts about the track
records of the companies and concerns about local environmental conditions
ultimately killed both proposals."
The law's final failure was a protracted and highly visible attempt to locate
an incinerator in Braintree. The State Secretary for Environmental Affairs ended
negotiations by ruling that siting a plant in such a densely populated area was
inherently inappropriate.76 The Secretary's decision was not made until more
than three years of the review process had elapsed and after the investment of
fourteen million dollars by the proponent, leading some observers to suspect
that the decision was as much dictated by local political pressure as by technical
assessments of risk.77
71. Id. at 279-80.
72. Id. at 286.
73. Id. at 282; Massachusetts Denies Extension Request for Only Firm with Hazardous Site Hopes,
STATE ENV'T REP., Aug. 19, 1992;See Ross Gelbspan,State to RethinkFirmfor Waste Site, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 10, 1991, at 31; John Glass, RecontekCourts Small Town with Big Promises, BOSTON Bus. J., July 23,
1990, at 1.
74. SCHMEIDLER & SANDMAN, supra note 64, at 282; MassachusettsDenies Extension Requestfor Only
Firm with Hazardous Site Hopes, supra note 73; See Gelbspan, supra note 73, at 3 1.
75. SCHMEIDLER &SANDMAN, supra note 64, at 282-83; Massachusetts Denies Extension Requestfor
Only Firm with Hazardous Site Hopes, supra note 73; See Gelbspan, supra note 73, at 31.
76. BRION, supra note 64, at 14.
77. The density of Braintree's population and the congestion of its roads may have made it an
inappropriate site for the proposed facility. These circumstances were apparent from the outset, however.
That it took three years for the Secretary to invoke these as justifications suggests that this may be yet
anothercase where the political voices of highly mobilized neighbors were far louder than those of citizens
elsewhere who might have received some benefit from the siting of the plant.
The sense of mistrust increased when the state Secretary of Environmental Affairs unilaterally
changed the rules (by requiring a ruling on site suitability that was not called for in the
legislation) and again when he demanded unnecessary impact analysis beyond the requirements
of the scope. Opponents reasonably interpreted these signals to indicate that the siting process
was a facade and that the real game was the familiar one of political pressure and threat. We
do not think the secretary intended this result, but we think he could have foreseen it.
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None of the seven cases saw the kind of negotiation the sponsors of the
Massachusetts statute had hoped to promote.7" Some of the negotiations were
every bit as contentious as previous "announce-and-defend" actions. Even
negotiations that began somewhat more amicably never reached the issue of
compensation, although it was supposed to be the cornerstone of the new ap-
proach. Faced with entrenched opposition, developers either withdrew their
proposals or had them terminated by the State. Despite the sponsors' intentions,
no case ever reached arbitration and outside mediators were never enlisted.
It would be a somewhat different story if all the negotiations had failed,
and some proposals ultimately had been arbitrated. Instead the entire system
broke down.79 Although the siting system's defeat of unsound or dangerous
proposals should be regarded as a virtue, the overall record of the Massachusetts
statute clearly is a disappointment. Tens of millions of private and public
dollars were spent; the hours invested by business people, citizens, and state
and local officials are beyond reckoning. Yet no proposals were approved, and
the experience of evaluating one project and rejecting it never prompted a
community to solicit more attractive alternatives. No abutting communities ever
competed for a proposed facility. Projects that were publicly praised as environ-
mentally sound but wrongly located (like the incinerator in Braintree) never
found a more suitable home.
D. The Legislative Aftermath
In 1990, shortly after the Secretary's intervention in Braintree, he and the
Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection jointly convened
a special Siting Policy Task Force to recommend improvements in the siting
process.8" By the end of the year, the Task Force recommended scrapping the
siting law, concluding that it "has proven to be unsatisfactory to project
proponents, local communities, regulators and environmentalists. It has forced
O'Hare & Sanderson, supra note 29, at 371. Both authors were involved in the drafting of the siting law
and the latter counseled Clean Harbors, Inc., the developer in the Braintree case.
78. The posturing and positioning that did take place can be understood in terms of classic bargaining
theory. See generally THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1980). Threats, preemptive moves, and
the imposition of costs were de rigueur, while evidence of a mutual gains or win-win approach was
conspicuously absent.
79. Several years after the law was in place, Bacow and Milkey noted:
The intense criticism of the first three proposals filed under the Massachusetts statute should not be
interpreted as an indictment of the Massachusetts approach .... [It] does not attempt to ignore local
opposition but rather to incorporate it into the siting process. If the costs of a proposal outweigh its
benefits, then it should be defeated by local opposition.
Bacow & Milkey, supra note 25, at 304.
80. Siting Policy Task Force Final Report on Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Process Improvements
(Dec. 6, 1990) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Task Force Report]. See also O'Hare & Sanderson,
supra note 29, at 367-69 (describing the Braintree case).
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everyone who has participated in the Siting Process to spend substantial time,
money, energy and resources needlessly.""1
The Task Force recommended "total overhaul" of the legislation, abolition
of the state Site Safety Council, and creation of a new Hazardous Waste
Development Board. This new Board would play an "advocacy" role, and
actively promote the siting of new facilities. The Task Force also urged the
State to implement a broad waste management plan, make a stronger case for
the need for treatment plants, and promulgate general standards for site suit-
ability.
The Siting Council itself subsequently convened a working group which
recast the recommendations into proposed legislation, but did not make any
major substantive changes.82 The Governor's office eventually endorsed the
package, and it was introduced in the state legislature in early 1993," 3 but no
action has been taken and the original siting law remains on the books.
The proposed legislation seeks to resolve policy and technical issues at a
general level, rather than case by case. Under the new plan, for example, the
State would issue a nonsite-specific "Request for Proposals" (RFP) from private
operators. These proposals would then be reviewed to determine which best met
the State's waste management needs.84 The State would also examine the
operator's and project's finances. Once the State approved a propoial, the
operator would select a specific site meeting the previously issued criteria.85
The operator would then file a "Notice of Intent" (NOI) with the relevant city
or town. Instead of initiating a negotiation process, the NOI would freeze
zoning regulations; waste facilities would be permitted in any land zoned for
industry.86
Under this new approach, the State would essentially handle all
environmental review of the project. The State would review specific impacts
and ensure that the project was consistent with the general RFP. Local Citizens
Advisory Committees could participate in the scoping and commentary phases
of this assessment process, but would apparently lack decision-making power.
The only local control would be exercised by the municipal Board of Health,
81. Task Force Report, supra note 80, at I.
82. Somewhat surprisingly, this review process sparked little public attention and debate; in spite of
the wide dissatisfaction with the present statute, there seems to be little enthusiasm for any alternative.
83. H. Res. 4815, Mass. Gen. Sess. (1993).
84. The original statute allowed nonsite-specific proposals. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21 D, § 9 (West
1981). That provision was not really used by developers, though the companies which ultimately proposed
facilities in Freetown and Orange asked a large number of communities to respond to their inquiries.
85. "In most instances, the RFP should not specify a location for the facility or the precise technology
to be utilized by the candidate operator. Responses to the RFP should also not specify a proposed site,
unless the candidate is willing to proceed only at a particular site." Task Force Report, supra note 80, at
5.
86. The NOI would also "trigger an entitlement on the part of the site community and any affected
community to technical assistance grants paid by the project proponents." The size of a grant would be




which would issue a "site assignment." However, the Board would apply the
standards of the state Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), not its
own regulations.87
This recommended process represents a sharp break with the existing
system: negotiation has been all but scrapped. The Task Force did note that "a
facility developer is free to offer communities additional compensation beyond
what is specified under such a formula in exchange for an agreement by such
communities not to appeal the DEP licensing decision or the site assignment.""
Unfortunately, nothing in the proposal specifies how such agreements might
be reached. Instead of providing for mediation or even arbitration, the new
process simply assumes that disgruntled parties will file administrative or legal
appeals.
In short, the key elements of the new policy would be: preempting local
land use power, giving the state a stronger leadership role, and making a better
public case for the need for modem waste treatment. Collectively, the three
seem very much like a return to "announce and defend."
Is the proposed legislation justified by the evident failure of the existing
siting law? For many, negotiation has been given more than a fair test. The
persistence of the siting stalemate is prima facie evidence that these issues
simply cannot be settled at the bargaining table. Hard decisions have to be
made, and some communities will have to live with the consequences, whether
they like them or not. 9
But "announce and defend" also has a failed past. "In fairness," the Task
Force warned, "the Commonwealth should not ask communities to accept
hazardous waste facilities unless it is prepared to articulate clearly why the
development of a particular facility addresses an important need of the
Commonwealth as a whole."9 It is hardly obvious, however, why statements
of general benefit will convince communities to embrace facilities that they
currently oppose. Indeed, the Task Force itself concedes that:
87. Id. at 8.
88. Id.
89. There are ironies in recommending abandonment of a negotiated approach; the most obvious is
the apparent willingness to resurrect an "announce-and-defend"system that was deemed unworkable more
than ten years ago. There is also irony in the fact that in winning battles under the negotiation statute,
communities like Braintree may ultimately lose the home-rule war if a new law further strips them of their
power. Moreover, even as the Task Force made its recommendation to abandon negotiation, evidence of
successful negotiation surfaced. For example, the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority negotiated
agreements with a community to accept waste from newly constructed sewage treatment facilities. These
were the result ofad hoc negotiations,not statutorily mandated processes, but they did includecompensation.
Interview with Paul Levy, Former Executive Director of the Massachusetts Water Resource Authority (May
3, 1994); See Monica Gupta, The Fore River Shipyard and MWRA: NIMBYism and Negotiations (May
24, 1993, unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
90. Task Force Report, supra note 80, at 2.
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Despite improvements in regulation over the past decade, it is
impossible to guarantee the neighbors of a proposed facility that there
will be no increase in public health, safety or environmental risk from
the facility, or that regulatory mechanisms are in place and adequately
funded to ensure perpetual compliance with state-of-the-art controls
on the facility's operation.9"
Under such circumstances, a better approach is to examine the failure of the
siting law in more detail. Its reform may prove more effective than its
replacement.
III. Why Did the Massachusetts Siting Law Fail?
With hindsight it is possible to identify specific mistakes in the design and
implementation of the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act.
Section A describes practical problems with the negotiation process, from a
developer's initial filing to the specter of final arbitration. Section B reviews
the fundamental design flaws underlying these practical difficulties.
A. Specific Problems of Implementation
1. The Notice Of Intent Process
Most negotiated transactions begin with one party seeking the other out.
The Massachusetts siting law stipulated that a negotiation began when a
developer filed a NOI to construct a facility at an identified site. To
communities, a NOI filing, which simultaneously froze local zoning and started
the procedural clock ticking, seemed more like a preemptive strike than an
invitation to negotiate. Consequently, local officials never engaged in the
cost/benefit analysis envisioned by the law's sponsors, choosing instead to view
NOIs as an assault on self-determination. For example, when officials in
Haverhill first learned that the city had been targeted for hazardous waste facili-
ties through a press conference held by the developer in Boston,92 they
responded with a law suit against the Siting Council.93
Launching negotiations preemptively may incur enormous political costs,
but informal inquiries also entail risk. Would-be developers may face
91. Id.
92. SCHMEIDLER & SANDMAN, supra note 64, at 279-280.




disadvantageous zoning changes before a formal NOI is filed.94 In addition,
determining how much of a development plan should be revealed-and to
whom-is an unavoidably awkward exercise. Presenting a full-blown plan may
appear preemptive; less developed proposals may lead to local suspicion of
information-witholding or a perception of poor planning.
Despite these pitfalls, informal approaches in Freetown and Orange
produced better results than the statute's more formal procedures. In Freetown,
the developer filed a general NOI without naming a site, stating that it would
proceed only in a location nominated by a town. After five communities
responded to this invitation, State environmental officials eliminated two as
technically inappropriate. The developer chose to deal with Freetown from the
remaining three, and astutely made the announcement with town officials."
In the second case, the developer simultaneously contacted many communi-
ties, stating that it would file a formal proposal only where there was genuine
willingness to negotiate appropriate conditions and compensation. The company
promised it would not try to initiate a project where one was not wanted;
unreceptive communities could simply ignore the inquiry instead of fighting
a NOI. Fifteen municipalities did express interest, and the developer chose
Orange from a short-list of three, keeping the others as fall-back options.96
The developers in Freetown and Orange could have exercised their
statutory rights and begun the siting process by filing formal NOIs. Yet by
seeking volunteers, they skillfully changed the political symbolism of the
negotiations. Elected officials were already on record as having an interest,
albeit guarded, in the projects. Instead of being cast as the vanguard of a town's
defense against hazardous waste, local assessment committees were transformed
into potential agencies of economic development.
In spite of these more auspicious beginnings, however, talks broke down
in both cases. Opposition in Freetown deepened when residents learned that the
proposed site was over a large aquifer. Prospects worsened after the selectmen
returned from the developer's Pennsylvania facility with the report that no grass
grew around it. A subsequent town referendum overwhelmingly rejected the
proposal, which the developer, in the face of this resistance and apparently
concerned about profitability, then withdrew.97 The Orange process ran
94. This dilemma often arises in other regulatory settings. For example, subdividersof land sometimes
believe it is necessary to preserve their rights (and their leverage) by filing a plan that maximizes currently
allowed density. With their fallback thus covered, they feel that they can safely start a negotiation over
possible cluster zoning or some other more imaginative use of the land. What the developer regards as
simple self-protection, however, is often read by neighbors and officials as a heavy handed threat, carrying
the implicit message: "I will stick you with everything I can, if you do not rezone me."
95. SCHMEIDLER & SANDMAN, supra note 64, at 282-283. The statute gives developers the option of
identifying a specific site or filing a general notice of intent in which they essentially solicit proposals. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 9 (West 1981).
96. See Glass, supra note 73, at 1.
97. SCHMEIDLER & SANDMAN, supra note 64, at 283.
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somewhat longer, but similarly encountered growing opposition as citizens
learned about safety problems the developer was having with another facility.
State officials finally forced withdrawal of the proposal.9"
2. Certifying Feasible Proposals
The Massachussets law was designed to filter out proposals lacking
engineering or environmental merit. Within just fifteen days of a NOI filing,
the Siting Council was obligated to screen the proposal to determine whether
it was "feasibk and deserving."99 Although this procedure was intended merely
as a threshold to be crossed before the agency could award technical assistance
to a community, the unfortunate choice'of statutory language made the "feasible
and deserving" designation seem like a hasty endorsement of the proposal. °
In two instances, the Council insisted on meeting the fifteen day deadline
despite local requests to wait until detailed environmental studies were
conducted.' In other cases, controversy over "feasible and deserving" status
continued long after the original ruling. For example, the Council initially
hesitated when Haverhill petitioned for revocation of the "feasible and
deserving" determination in the wake of an explosion at the developer's New
Jersey facility. As a result of this preliminary determination, communities
believed, virtually from the outset of the siting process, that the Council
harbored a pro-developer bias.' 2
Although public distrust of the Siting Council became apparent early on,
it was never adequately addressed.0 3 Had the "feasible and deserving"
procedure not been mandated by statute, the Siting Council could have screened
out fly-by-night-operators by requiring a substantial filing fee.' 04 As it turned
out, the Siting Council did not press for statutory change, perhaps because it
feared that the legislature might wilt under pressure from increasingly agitated
communities and make wholesale changes in the role that the State and its
agencies played in the siting process.
98. Massachusetts Denies Extension Request for Only Firm with Hazardous Site Hopes, supra note
73.
99. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 7 (West 1981).
100. "[M]any participants incorrectly interpreted that decision as giving a green light to construction
of the facility itself, not just continuation of the siting process." O'Hare & Sanderson, supra note 29, at
371. O'Hare and Sanderson attribute such misunderstandings to the "pervasive atmosphere of mistrust in
Massachusetts politics," though as argued here the design of the siting process itself may well have
exacerbated municipal hostility to the state. Id.
101. Bacow& Milkey, supra note 25, at 302-03.
102. Revocation of the Haverhill developer's "feasible and deserving" status was on and off the
Council's agenda, but before it was acted upon, the Governor asked the company to withdraw from the siting
process and it ultimately did so. SCHMEIDLER & SANDMAN, supra note 64, at 280.
103. See Id.





A related problem was coordinating the new siting process with pre-
existing impact analysis procedures required by the Massachusetts "baby
NEPA" statute. In the decade preceding enactment of the Massachusetts siting
law, impact analysis had already become a catalyst for many environmental
disputes. Opponents of proposed highway programs, new power stations, and
other projects routinely went to the courts to compel impact assessment before
construction commenced. After construction began, these same opponents
challenged the scope and adequacy of the impact assessment.
While it was recognized that such challenges could derail the carefully
structured negotiation process, the political climate barred any relaxation of
impact assessment requirements. Accordingly, the drafters of the Massachusetts
law took impact assessment as it had been practiced and awkwardly knitted it
into the new siting law. Specifically, the statute required the project proponent
to file a Preliminary Notification Form (PNF) that would encompass both
environmental and socio-economic issues. 5' After a twenty day public comment
period, the Council was to determine the appropriate scope of the developer's
next submission, a more complete study called a Preliminary Project Impact
Report with a Socio-Economic Appendix.
The authors of the law hoped that the reports would be "the basis for
negotiations between the developer and the host community."'' 6 Once the
precise project impacts were carefully identified, the parties supposedly could
bargain over appropriate mitigation and compensation. The Siting Council and
the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs would approve a final impact
report only after the developer and the community had reached a negotiated
agreement.
Unfortunately, the attempt to link siting negotiation and impact assessment
was poorly conceived. First, reliance on standard environmental review
procedures meant that the Massachusetts siting process was saddled with many
of the political problems that had bedeviled impact assessment. If would-be
plant operators produced anything less than a catalog of worst case scenarios,
they risked community accusations of bad faith and deception. Moreover, a fair
list of potential disasters would likely destroy all community support. The
dilemma was particularly acute because developers were supposed to bargain
next with critics who inferred the worst motives from any errors or omissions
in the environmental study.
Second, by making the Siting Council responsible for determining the
scope of a developer's studies, the impact assessment procedures further
105. Submission in most cases was due after the ninety day comment period that followed the Council's
"feasible and deserving" determination. Id. at 277.
106. Bacow and Milkey, supra note 25, at 283.
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compromised the Council's desired neutrality. The comment period that
followed the submission of the developer's PNF was almost certain to produce
demands for expanding the geographic area and range of issues to be studied.
Skeptics could interpret Council denial of any such requests as further evidence
of pro-developer bias.
Third, the law's approach betrayed a stilted view of negotiation, which
assumed that formal impact assessment would identify a list of issues to be
jointly resolved. Although nothing barred negotiations from beginning earlier,
they were not encouraged to commence until after the Council had approved
the PNF.'0 7 By not supporting earlier developer-community negotiations over
the scope and method of impact analysis, the statute increased the risk that
developers would polarize issues and damage their credibility by making
unilateral determinations. The authors of the law may have hoped that the
Siting Council's ruling on the scope of subsequent studies would narrow the
negotiating agenda. Yet it seems unrealistic to assume that citizens and
municipal officials who publicly assailed a developer's proposed studies would
then accept the Council's verdict as to scope and placidly go on to negotiate
compensation.
Some of these difficulties might have been tempered by encouraging
developer-community negotiation of the scope and method of environmental
reviews. Joint determination of the geographic area to be studied, the kinds of
impacts to be identified, and how they would be measured could have given
the findings more credibility. That mutual exercise might also have served as
a first step in establishing a more constructive negotiating relationship. O The
sponsors of the Massachusetts statute hoped to avoid the "announce-and-defend"
pitfalls of site selection, but created exactly the same dynamic with the impact
assessment procedure.
4. The Use of Technical Assistance
Concerned that most siting negotiations would involve small, semi-rural
communities lacking in engineering expertise, the state authorized provision of
technical assistance grants to local assessment committees. Municipalities, it
was thought, would use these funds to hire independent, reliable experts, who
would objectively assess developers' information and analysis. "Notice that
when a party to negotiations is buying information to form his own position
in the negotiations, he has no incentive to deceive himself or to obtain
107. O'HARE ET AL., supra note 14, at 184.
108. It has been suggested that the sharing of information and ideas might even produce more reliable
scientific data. BAdOW & WHEELER, supra note 40, at 76-103.
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propaganda. He wants as nearly correct a reading of the situation as he can
obtain."' 0 9
This optimism was not borne out: communities regularly used the money
for adversarial studies."' The belief that communities would invest in dispas-
sionate studies derived from an exchange view of negotiation which posits that
a party will weigh an offer against the likely consequences of nonagreement;
success depends on a shrewd weighing of costs and benefits. Communities had
a different view of negotiation. Intent on blocking proposed treatment plants,
they used the grants to hire friendly expert witnesses. Why underwrite an
"objective" assessment if you suspect the other side of twisting the facts to
favor its self-interest? If a court or arbitrator is expected to split the difference
between the parties' claims, moderation earns no reward."' The same logic held
true when communities lobbied the Siting Council, other state agencies, and
the governor for relief. Dire forecasts make good headlines." 2
The Siting Council could have moderated this behavior by conditioning
technical assistance grants on local willingness to have a community's
consultants share information and agree on a common methodology with a
developer's experts. Granting a different State agency funding discretion might
have lessened the appearance of developer bias by the Council. Instead, the
Council found itself in an increasingly adversarial relationship with com-
munities requesting ever more technical aid.
5. Absence of Effective Mediation
The Council's own regulations authorized an independent mediator if,
among other things, the Council determined that negotiations were "not
progressing in a satisfactory manner.""' 3 Notwithstanding repeated stalemates,
however, outside mediation was never attempted, even in the most contentious
109. O'HARE ET. AL., supra note 14, at 172. This assumption may be valid in other situations. For
example, a prospective buyer of a house should want an inspection that identifies the true nature and costs
of necessary repairs before making a bid; an erroneous list of problems could scare the buyer away from
otherwise attractive property.
110. "For example, Braintree received several hundred thousand dollars in technical assistance grant
money from the state, foreseen in the legislation as a source of consulting expertise to empower the
community in negotiations. It used these funds instead to hire lawyers to oppose the project and obstruct
the process .... O'Hare & Sanderson, supra note 29, at 369.
IlI. Technical reports that alleged environmental problems might also be used to substantiate permit
denials from local boards of health. Under a parallel portion of the siting legislation such agencies retained
jurisdiction over some technical issues. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I ll, § 150B (West 1981).
112. A negotiation analyst might question the logic of killing a proposal without studying its
consequences. If time and money were not constrained, there would be strategic advantage in keeping two
sets of impact books: one public, for litigation and lobbying; and a second confidential, to evaluate the
desirability of possible deals. In the real world, however, resource scarcity forces consideration of different
research investments before their relative value becomes clear. In an emotionally charged atmosphere, few
public officials will fund studies that might produce unpopular results.
113. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 990, § I 1.02(2)(b) (1986).
The Yale Journal on Regulation
cases. This failure may have been due to institutional politics, but it may also
reflect too narrow a conception of mediation.
The regulatory language suggests that mediation was meant to give the
parties a last chance for agreement before arbitration intervened. Such a notion
would be akin to conventional collective bargaining in which a neutral party
is called in to avert a strike. Some traditionalists in the field of labor relations
believe that parties become serious about negotiation only when the specter of
a strike or lock-out looms."14 The hard choices and decisions necessary for
parties to resolve a dispute are unlikely to be made until all sides realize
disaster is imminent. 115
Commentators have challenged the appropriateness of the crisis
intervention model of mediation, even for labor disputes." 6 In any event, the
collective bargaining model offers a poor analogy to siting decisions."' Even
in bitter labor disputes the parties usually share a common past and future that
dampens extreme behavior. Experienced negotiators may threaten a plant shut-
down, yet privately recognize the high costs of impasse. Siting negotiators have
no such common history from which to draw guidance."' Even more impor-
tantly, siting negotiators do not necessarily share a future: the paramount goal
of some local citizens is to make sure that they never have a waste facility in
their neighborhood. Such people will feel no obligation to create a constructive
working relationship. The project proponent may have a longer view, but will
lack credibility with local parties. These strangers must nonetheless cope with
difficult engineering, public health, and financial issues in an unfamiliar
regulatory context. Saddling them with the added burden of managing a
complex, multi-party negotiation may well have asked too much.
The failure even to try independent mediation might seem surprising given
the simultaneous use of innovative consensus-building techniques in other
environmental disputes."9 Indeed, in 1987 Massachusetts actually created the
State Office of Mediation to promote such approaches. 20 Part of the reason why
mediation was not pursued more actively was political. Despite the drafters'
114. E.g., JOHN T. DUNLOP, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION AND CONSENSUS BUILDING 15-16(1984).
115. Id.
116. CHARLES HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM (1988).
117. Lawrence Susskind and Alan Weinstein, Towards a Theory of EnvironmentalDispute Resolution,
9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 331, 334-36 (1980).
118. One exception in Massachusetts was the Clean Harbors proposal in Braintree. The company had
operated an incinerator in that community for more than a decade.
119. BINGHAM, supra note 40. See also New State Offices of Mediation Bring Total to 12, CONSENSUS
(MIT-Harvard Public Disputes Program, Cambridge, Mass.), Apr. 1993, 1, 5 (announcing the creation of
two state mediation offices to promote nontraditional conflict management techniques).
120. There are critics of this trend. See Douglas Amy, EnvironmentalDispute Resolution: The Promise





intentions to establish the Siting Council as an explicitly neutral entity,''
numerous stages of the negotiation process, especially certifying feasibility and
controlling limited technical assistance funds, undermined this essential
objective. With the Siting Council widely perceived by communities as a
hostile, pro-developer force, the prospects for effective mediation by the State
were severely constrained.
6. Arbitration Procedures
In the event of impasse, the Massachusetts siting statute required "final and
binding arbitration" of siting agreements. 2 2 The statute empowered the Siting
Council to declare a stalemate as early as sixty days after approval of the pre-
liminary project plan, although the agency did have discretion to postpone such
a finding on the joint request of the developer and the local assessment commit-
tee to prolong the negotiations. 2 1 Council oversight and the short time frame
were intended to spur the parties to serious bargaining.
The design of the arbitration procedure undermined much of the political
legitimacy and scientific credibility of the siting law. Notwithstanding the
engineering, scientific, economic, and ethical complexities of hazardous waste
facility siting, the statute vested almost unbridled discretion in the arbitrator,
merely instructing him or her to "resolve the issues in dispute between the local
assessment committee and the developer."' 24
Detailed regulations would seemingly have been an invitation to lawsuits
by disgruntled parties claiming that the arbitrator had deviated from the
provisions. But the absence of standards meant that important siting decisions
were seemingly left to a flip of a coin. 25 Unelected and unaccountable to the
public, the arbitrator was virtually insulated from all judicial review.' 26 Some
supporters of the law extolled this capriciousness as a virtue.
If the parties fear that the arbitrator will (inevitably) understand the
issues imperfectly and will not be sensitive to either party's interest
121. Under the siting law, the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Management was given
responsibility for attracting potential developers of treatment plants. In turn, the Department of
Environmental Quality Engineering-since renamed the Department of Environmental Protection -- would
enforce regulations and grant permits. It was precisely because these two agencies were publicly perceived
as prodevelopmentand proenvironmentalrespectively that the statute authorized a new entity, the Site Safety
Council,to oversee the negotiationprocess and play a facilitative role. O'HARE ET. AL., supra note 14, at 183.
122. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 15 (West 1981).
123. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 15 (West 1981).
124. Id.
125. See generally Robert Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 970'(1979).
126. Indeed, the statute played legal brinkmanship with established principles of administrative law,
notably limits on delegation, but survived a test challenge. Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety
Council, 466 N.E.2d 102 (Mass. 1984).
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as well as the parties' representatives themselves, then the threat of
arbitration should provide an incentive to negotiate. To put it another
way, the parties may settle merely to avoid the "roll of the dice"..
127
Arbitration thus was intended, in part, to serve as a doomsday device so
unpredictable and dangerous that the negotiators would seldom, if ever, resort
to it.
Such a prescription is consistent with the game theoretic, microeconomic
orientation of the siting law. Negotiation analysts have long been fascinated by
so-called chicken contests. In the same spirit, the Massachusetts siting process
was designed to make the parties act like pedestrians handcuffed together in
the path of an on-coming vehicle: they could avoid a collision with the
arbitrator only by mutually deciding which way to jump.
In the abstract, this black box form of arbitration may have given the
Massachusetts siting process a certain perverse elegance, but more than ten
years of stalemated negotiations presents strong evidence that such a device
does not work. If anything, negotiators were apparently quite willing to stand
firm in the face of arbitration and wait for the other side to capitulate. As it
happened, no one blinked.
To make matters worse, the negotiation compelled by the statute was not
truly symmetrical. A private developer would propose and build a new plant
only if it seemed potentially profitable. The firm could drop out of the process
any time the costs of pursuing approvals further seemed likely to outweigh
expected benefits.
By contrast, communities, having lost their sovereignty over land use,
ostensibly were given little choice but to negotiate.12 Arbitration might offer
some refuge if a developer offered too little compensation, but here too, risks
and burdens were not symmetrical. If an arbitrator ordered too generous a
benefits package, the developer could simply elect not to build the facility.129
Yet if the arbitrator erred in the other direction by awarding too little, the
municipality would have to swallow the result. 30 The municipality might
conceivably still pursue administrative appeals of any permits awarded by state
127. O'HARE ET. AL., supra note 15, at 170.
128. This asymmetry is in contrast to collective bargaining, in which extreme behavior on the part of
both labor and management is typically constrained by a common interest in the economic health of the
business. In siting disputes there is no underlying sense of a shared fate.
129. Doing so would mean swallowing the considerablesunk costs of negotiationand permit processing,
although those costs should not bear on the economic wisdom of further investment. The municipality
would incur negotiation costs, too.
130. Bacow and Milkey do not see the asymmetry as being so stark. "Similarly, an arbitration award
is not binding on a host community because the community can subsequently attempt to withhold the site
assignment permit or challenge the state's grant of a construction and operation license." Bacow& Milkey,




and environmental agencies, or lobby fiercely for legislative relief, but these
actions would be thin reeds on which to cling."'
The Massachusetts statute was intended to be a departure from the old
"announce and defend" approach to siting, but arbitration still cast the,
threatening shadow of state preemption. Intent on forcing an end to stalemate,
the architects of the new process seemingly overlooked how people's passions
about local autonomy would poison the atmosphere for negotiation. Instead,
formal economic analysts simply stipulated arbitration and assumed that rational
actors would seek to maximize their welfare accordingly. In practice, however,
many communities refused to accept either the legitimacy of arbitration in par-
ticular, or the siting process in general. Accordingly, they acted to subvert both.
This was hardly irrational, even in the economic sense: communities who
wanted to stymie the state and vindicate their autonomy were successful.
B. Design Flaws in the Massachusetts Siting Process
I
The failure of the Massachusetts siting law is not an indictment of siting
negotiation per se. In light of the foregoing experience, it is possible to identify
three fundamental flaws in the statute's design: first, the requirement that
communities negotiate; second, the needlessly adversarial nature of the
bargaining process; and third, an insufficiently neutral state role in mediation
and facilitation. These reflect an overarching error: an insistence on conceptual-
izing negotiation in narrow economic terms and a concomitant lack of attention
to process considerations. Had these problems not existed, stalemate might still
have occurred; but with these problems, it was virtually inevitable.
1. The Paradox of Mandatory Negotiation
Negotiation is usually thought of as a consensual process in which parties
are free to make a deal or walk away from one. By contrast, the Massachusetts
siting law compelled cities and towns to negotiate.'32 The Massachusetts
mandate was backed up by the prospect of "final and binding arbitration" in
the event of impasse. Some legislators insisted on this provision in the belief
131. In assessing the Massachusetts approach, three closely-involved analysts concluded, "[W]e think
its most likely mode of failure will be that neighbors of some proposed facilities will not believe that a
negotiated settlement could be a more useful strategy for them than fighting tooth-and-nail; the community
that fights tooth-and-nail will probably succeed in deflecting new development."O'HARE ET. AL., supra note
14, at 171.
132. The National Labor Relations Act similarly compels labor and management to negotiate in "good
faith," and there has been much litigation over the years about the operational meaning of this phrase. See,
e.g., NRLB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). In the labor context, however, the parties are
under no compulsion to come to a resolution. Nonagreement does not necessarily mean bad faith. While
the government can declare temporary cooling off periods in certain instances, as a general matter it cannot
order binding arbitration.
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that merely compelling people to come to the table was not enough. The goal,
after all, was to site new waste treatment facilities. If negotiation failed, some
fall-back supposedly was necessary.
From a strictly utilitarian perspective, the compulsion to negotiate might
not seem to matter; parties should rationally weigh the proposals on the table
against the consequences of nonagreement, whether parties are bargaining on
their own accord or under the force of law. To act otherwise would be "irratio-
nal."' 3 3 As a matter of politics, however, people reacted negatively not only
to proposed projects, but also to a perceived lack of power to block them. The
compulsory aspect of the process became a lightning rod for deeply held views
about home rule and local autonomy.
34
Many of the sponsors of the siting statute were surprised by the political
backlash that it provoked. They had created the negotiation process, after all,
as an alternative to outright preemption of local land use control. Communities
were to be given a chance to influence the design and operation of a facility
and to win compensation.
In practice, however, most communities saw matters very differently.
Stripped of their traditional zoning and land use authority and ordered to the
bargaining table, small cities and towns targeted for waste treatment plants did
not feel empowered by the new siting statute. Distrustful of the State's motives
and threatened by the cocked gun of arbitration, they were forced to play by
rules they had had no hand in writing. Mandatory negotiation thus compounded
feelings of political alienation. The compulsory nature of the negotiations may
also have aggravated communities' environmental and health concerns. Indi-
viduals and groups strongly resist involuntary risks, yet willingly tolerate
greater risks that are voluntarily assumed.'35
133. This term carries a pejorative connotation. As Bacow and Milkey note, "consumers do not always
conduct the rational risk-benefit analysis that is attributed to them by economists." Bacow & Milkey, supra
note 25, at 277. Sometimes "irrational behavior" reveals not an inadequacy on the part of decision-makers,
but a failure of an economic model to capture all the pertinent considerations.
134. Braintree tried to "withdraw" from the siting process at one point, though it had no legal right
to do so. The city returned to the bargaining table only when the state threatened to award its technical
assistance grants to two abutting communities. A year later the local assessment committee again defied
the law by withdrawing and refusing to disband. New ad hoc groups of citizens took its place. O'Hare &
Sanderson, supra note 29, at 368.
135. For example, people resist involuntary risk exposure more keenly than voluntary risk
exposure.. . . Willingness to tolerate risk is also related to the perceived balance between
beneficiaries and cost bearers. This is possibly more a matter of the perceptions of "justice"
than risk; the greater the symmetry between the costs and benefits, the more willing are people
to tolerate risks for themselves and others. Finally, people are more prone to accept the risks
associated with new technologieswhen they are clearly linked to newjobs, economic growth,
and an increased standard of living.
Mazmanian & Stanley-Jones, supra note 7, at 57.
To make matters worse, of course, the adversary politics of siting risky facilities can encourage parties
to exaggerateor understate the supposeddangers ofa project. However, Jack Kartez notes that collaborative
negotiation may allow for a more constructive resolution of highly technical disputes, provided that
differences in perceptions are squarely acknowledged and people learn to reframe problems. Jack Kartez,
RationalArgumentsandlrrationalAudiences: Psychology, Planning, andPublic Judgment, 55 J. AM. PLAN.
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Thus provoked by the heavy-handed aspects of the siting process, local
residents never saw negotiation as the "win-win" opportunity the sponsors had
envisioned. 6 While orthodox decision analysts might label the behavior of
these residents as "irrational," such condemnation is probably unwarranted.""
The political costs of compulsion may have seemed unavoidable to the
law's sponsors; their goal, after all, was to prevent parochial responses to the
siting of facilities needed by the State. 3 ' Consensual negotiation must have
appeared to be an unlikely substitute for the bitter siting battles of prior years.
But experience in the Freetown and Orange cases suggests that negotiation need
not have been compelled and that preemption of local land use control was
perhaps unnecessary. 3 9 Although the Freetown and Orange proposals were
eventually rejected like the rest, they suggest that negotiation may take place
not only in spite of a lack of compulsion but because of it.
Moreover, the years after enactment of the siting statute witnessed some
encouraging cases of successful environmental negotiation. Paradoxically, even
as there were repeated failures under the siting law, the Massachusetts Water
Resource Authority (MWRA) was able to negotiate compensation agreements
with two different municipalities over storage and treatment of sludge from
newly constructed sewage facilities. The MWRA experience has yet to be
formally documented, but the apparent parallels and contrasts with the cases
under the siting law are quite provocative. 4 Both sets of cases involved con-
flicts between regional needs and local costs, and both governing agencies saw
compensation as a key to unlocking any impasse. However, the MWRA's
negotiations were entirely ad hoc, with none of the formalities or obligations
dictated by the siting law."' Those who advocate negotiation should ponder the
ASS'N 445, 451 (1989).
136. It may be a long way from laboratories and classrooms to the real world of public policy, but
researchers at Cornell have concludedthat students who play prisoner's dilemma and similar games become
more selfish and competitive after having studied microeconomics. Robert H. Frank et al., Does Studying
Economics Inhibit Cooperation?,J. ECON. PERsP., Spring 1993, at 159.
137. "The [negotiation] game is simply that which the parties act as if it is." James K. Sebenius,
Negotiation Analysis: A Characterizationand Review, 38 MGMT. Sc. 18, 31 (1992).
138. Not long before the siting law was enacted, several municipalities that had been under active
consideration for hazardous waste facilities had successfully lobbied for special state legislation that ex-
empted them from further consideration as sites. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 25, at 273.
139. See BRION, supra note 64, at 12; Glass, supra note 73, at 1; SCHMEIDLER & SANDMAN, supra note
64, at 282-83.
140. Interview with Paul Levy, former Executive Director of the Massachusetts Water Resource
Authority (May 3, 1994); see Gupta, supra note 89. As an independent government authority, the MWRA
could marshall state resources, tangibleand political, that would be beyond the reach of a private developer.
Also, its treatment facilities may have been perceived as less threatening, although they certainly prompted
opposition. Perhaps most importantly, the community that agreed to deal with the MWRA was also a
beneficiary of its harbor clean-up and new infrastructure activities.
141. The authors ofthe original siting law should not be faulted for failing to learn from negotiations
which then had not taken place, but it is curious that much later the Task Force that recommended scrapping
the. negotiation strategy took no apparent notice of the MWRA's success in reaching agreements with com-
munities. Other kinds ofNIMBY disputes may provide important lessons as well. Affordable housingissues
are different from waste treatment concerns, although not necessarily less controversial, but these cases
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fact that where it was mandated, it failed; but where it was improvised, it
succeeded. This scant evidence does not support a broad conclusion that it is
futile to formalize negotiation, but it does suggest that mandating negotiation
can backfire.
2. Adversarial Nature of the Process
By establishing gun-point negotiation, the siting law imparted a strong
adversarial cast to the resulting encounters. The statute permitted open-ended
offers, like those that developed into the Freetown and Orange proposals, but
most would-be facility developers apparently felt that it was enough to comply
with the letter of the law and start the negotiation process with a notice of
intent. By taking that initial step, developers sparked disputes that could only
escalate.
The law sent local officials and private citizens a decidedly mixed
message: it asked them to negotiate creatively with the facility developer while
implicitly encouraging them to arm in case of arbitration. In retrospect, the
siting statute did not adequately take into account the significant differences
between dispute resolution and deal-making.'42 In transactional cases, the parties
seek to create and distribute gain, yet are free to abandon the bargaining table
if there is little prospect of an attractive deal. In disputes, by contrast, the
parties are locked together, often in a struggle to decide who must swallow a
loss. Deprived of control, disputants can easily fall into the trap of blaming
each other for their own misfortune. Honest mistakes are read as malice, and
ad hominem attacks can dominate the debate. If constitutional rights or moral
principles are invoked, the stakes will likely escalate and adversarial behavior
will be virtually assured.
Had the siting statute not required impasse arbitration, and if communities
had consequently been free to walk away from the bargaining table, local
assessment committees would have had far less reason to spend the Siting
Council's technical assistance grants on lawyers and partisan studies. As it was,
local representatives had a strong incentive to exaggerate possible negative
impacts in the hopes of inflating an arbitrator's compensation award.
similarly involve public agencies, citizen groups, and abutting communities. Some private developers and
non-profit housing groups have learned to use Massachusetts' "anti-snob zoning" procedure as a vehicle
for multi-party, multi-issue negotiation. In the event of local deadlock, the State Appeals Committee
encourages mediated settlements. These cases not only offer some insight into what is required to resolve
waste facility disputes, but over time may also have created a modest local constituency for a negotiated
approachto NIMBY problems generally. See Michael Wheeler, Regional ConsensusonAffordable Housing:
Yes in My Backyard?, 12 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 139 (1993).
142. A Gresham's Law of Negotiation can also apply in these types of situations: when value-creating
and value-claiming impulses are intertwined, competitive bargaining impulses may drive out cooperative
ones. DAVID LAX& JAMES SEBENIUS, THE MANAGERAS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAININGFOR COOPERATIONAND




Communities realized that arbitration was a win-lose game; they should hardly
be faulted for taking this fact into account during their negotiations.
Unwittingly, the authors of the Massachusetts siting law replicated the
same kind of disputes they had sought to avoid. Several key factors, including
the compulsory nature of the negotiation, the developer's preemptory notice
of intent, and the specter of binding arbitration, conspired to put communities
on the defensive. People reacted to the developer's filing not as an invitation
to negotiate, but as the first salvo in a battle to defend their autonomy.
3. Problems of State Neutrality
As originally conceived, the Siting Council was intended to "encourage
and facilitate negotiations among the developer, the host community, abutting
communities, and any person interested in proposals for... hazardous waste
facilities on particular proposed or suggested sites." '143 In the course of legis-
lative debate, however, different interest groups demanded a place on the
Council, and by enactment, membership had grown to an unwieldy twenty-
one.'" Often unable to reach consensus internally, the Council was seldom
effective as a broker between communities and developers and between state
agencies with competing agendas.
Some of the Council's other responsibilities, such as ruling on "feasible
and deserving" status and technical assistance requests, compromised its claimed
neutrality and further hampered its capacity to mediate. This problem almost
certainly worsened over time; the longer the list of proposals the Council
blessed became, the more its credibility with communities shrunk.
As one municipality after another successfully forced developers to with-
draw proposals, the political importance of producing an operating waste
facility increased. Such conspicuous pressure probably further eroded local
confidence in the Council's neutrality.'45 Even as the political stakes got higher,
however, the Council may have resisted relinquishing its mediating function
to independent neutral bodies over whom it would have had limited control.
The string of failures also compounded the Council's problems by
stimulating opposition. Cities and towns did not want the dubious distinction
of hosting facilities rejected elsewhere. When a new developer filed a notice
of intent, local citizens were savvy enough to contact counterparts in cities that
had already defeated siting proposals. They learned through this network how
to confront and confound the Siting Council, not how to collaborate with it.
Even if the parties in a siting negotiation had had the help of a trusted mediator
143. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 4(10) (West 1981).
144. Interview with Lawrence S. Bacow, Professor, Department of Urban Studies and Planning,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. (Sept. 19, 1992).
145. See generallyCharles Wolf, A TheoryofNon-marketFailures, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1979,at 114.
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from the start, they would have faced a daunting assignment. Given that parties
negotiated without such assistance, it should not be surprising that difficult
issues became insurmountable and that parties painted themselves into comers.
Moreover, the State's incentives to play an activist role in the siting
process may have been overestimated by the law's drafters. 46 The law was
enacted through a rare and effective alliance between state industry and
environmental lobbies. Unfortunately, once the statute was in place, neither of
these constituencies mobilized to make it work. Although a pressing need for
modem treatment facilities was acknowledged in the abstract, the political costs
of supporting a particular proposal in a particular place apparently seemed too
great. Whatever gubernatorial support existed for the new siting process was
not transferable to specific siting proposals. According to one former Council
member, neither the King nor the Dukakis administration was willing to risk
the political heat that might result from promoting a project in a particular
community. "In this respect, the State's macro policy of encouraging the siting.
of additional facilities was at odds with the political establishment's reluctance
to expend political capital to resolve the problem." 47
4. Narrow Economic Frame
The siting law's most fundamental flaw was its establishment of an exces-
sively narrow negotiating agenda focused on financial compensation.
Compensation was intended as an inducement, a way of tilting the economic
scales so that neighbors who would otherwise regard a proposed treatment plant
as a serious loss might come to see it as a possible gain. This strategy
backfired. Many local residents construed the compensation offer as a bribe and
responded accordingly. Tendering a bribe not only demeans the offeror ("only
a crook would propose such a thing"), but insults the offeree ("and how dare
they think we would take it!").
The emphasis on financial compensation may also have heightened local
concerns about environmental and health hazards. The Siting Council and other
officials labored hard to persuade communities that proposed facilities would
have to meet all state and federal safety standards. But those pledges were
undercut by promises of compensation, since a safe project would presumably
not require it.
146. O'Hare and Sanderson attribute some of this absence of leadership to the nature of the process
they themselves helped design: "We believe its principal liability is that it offers two fatal temptations: to
public officials, it appears to offer an alternative to taking leadership risks; and to frightened citizens, it
appears to offer a way to avoid, rather than confront and control, physical risks and anxiety." O'Hare &
Sanderson, supra note 29, at 375. Once the law was in place, State officials could simply adopt a "hands-
off" posture that would ostensibly respect a community's right to negotiate as it saw fit.




Moreover, the narrowness of the Massachusetts process reinforced
communities' already strong inclinatioi to be self-regarding. With NIMBYism
defined as market failure and negotiated compensation as its answer, siting was
reduced to bargaining over how much a developer might have to pay a city or
town to embrace an otherwise unacceptable project. We should not wonder that
communities looked only to their own parochial interests; nothing in the law
or the process encouraged them to take a broader view of public welfare. Yet
there were many potential beneficiaries of successful negotiation: municipalities
elsewhere that would be protected from illegal dumping; companies that would
now be able to comply with waste management regulations more efficiently;
and, eventually, consumers who would purchase these companies' products. But
none of these beneficiaries was represented at the bargaining table. While the
compensation received by the host community can be linked to treatment fees
charged by a facility and, in turn, to the balance sheets of businesses, munici-
palities, and citizens whose welfare would be advanced, actual participants in
the Massachusetts negotiation process should not be faulted for regarding the
process as no more than horse trading.
As a practical matter, reliance on private compensation may have meant
that there were not enough horses to trade. Fees charged by a plant operator
would be unlikely to capture all external benefits of waste treatment. For
example, residents of other neighborhoods might unknowingly enjoy a lower
risk of illegal dumping. Even if such benefits were made known, these
communities would have a strong incentive to free ride. In addition, conven-
tional discounting techniques might well trivialize the value of reduced dumping
to future generations.14
Could compensation have been sweetened to take such factors into
account? The State itself would seem an obvious source of supplementary
compensation, especially in the prosperous 1980s. 149 For a variety of political
and institutional reasons, however, no state initiatives were forthcoming. At
least one Council member lobbied energetically for bundling a solvent
reprocessing facility with a highly sought state-sponsored Microcomputer Cen-
ter."'0 Such a policy would have linked the economic benefits of the computer
sector to the negative impacts of its production technology, but nothing came
148. See generfdy MARK SACoFF, THE ECONOMY OF TIE EARTH: PIHiLOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENr
(1988).
149. The amount of State compensation, of course, should not exceed the social benefit generated by
a successful siting, or more specifically, the net benefit not captured by the operator's fees. The magnitude
of that benefit and, hence, the maximum size of the appropriate compensation would surely be debatable.
Given the market imperfections, however, it would be folly to read the lack of a bargaining overlap between
a private developer and a community as a signal of inefficiency.
150. Interview with Bacow, supra note 144.
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of this effort. 1' Other benefits could have been similarly linked. If funds for
refurbishing state parks are limited, foi example, why not put a municipality
that has accepted a hazardous waste facility first in line for such aid? If several
new community colleges are to be built, why not give credit to cities or towns
that have helped their neighbors? Better still, if old industrial sites are targeted
for environmental clean-up, why not tie that state effort to the creation of a new
treatment plant?
52
State subsidization of compensation packages would have added far more
than money to the negotiation ledger. Provision of state aid would have visibly
and symbolically expressed the substantial public benefit of new waste
treatment plants. Moreover, had the scope of the negotiation agenda been thus
expanded, the role of the Siting Council as perceived by local residents might
have been transformed from nemesis to powerful ally in efforts to win state aid.
Exclusive reliance on private compensation doomed the Massachusetts
statute. The bargaining range was narrowly defined by the developer's expected
profit and the community's parochial needs. Any municipality that agreed for
a price to host a facility would stigmatize itself as the lowest and perhaps most
desperate bidder.'53 Private dealmaking offered no apparent reward for doing
right by one's neighbors. In fact, communities had good reason to fear that by
saying yes to a facility today, they would get stuck with worse tomorrow.
154
A "fair share" policy that would have exempted host communities from
subsequent regional obligations could have helped alleviate this understandable
fear. As it was, the handful of communities where treatment plants were
proposed felt unjustly singled out, particularly when there was no legal
assurance that their neighbors would be called upon to assume comparable
burdens.
151. Analogous strategies were being instituted for other land use problems. The Boston Redevelop-
ment Authority adopted a "parcel-to-parcel" linkage program requiring bidders for lucrative downtown
development sites to assume responsibility for specific projects in disadvantagedneighborhoods. Similarly,
Executive Order 215 disqualified municipalities that failed to provide a threshold amount of affordable
housing from receiving any discretionary State grants. Exec. Order No. 215, 304 Mass. Reg. 28 (1982).
It is not clear how effective these policies have been. The affluent communities that practice
exclusionary zoning (another form of NIMBYism) are the least hungry for state aid. Even if the order has
limited fiscal reach, however, it does carry some moral suasion. The State refuses to subsidize communities
that subvert general policy.
152. PILLER, supra note 4, at 191-93.
153. The costs of being stigmatized as the "region's dump" may be capitalized in diminished real estate
prices. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 25, at 268. See generally DAPHNE A. KENYON, THE ECONOMICS OF
NIMBYs 2-4 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1991) (summarizing six empirical studies on the effect of
NIMBYs on surrounding property values).
154. Walpole, Massachusetts recently fought a proposed sludge facility in part because it felt it was
already doing its share of the state's dirty business in hosting a maximum security prison.
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IV. Reconciling Local and Regional Needs
Although the Massachusetts negotiation experiment has come and gone,
the problem of siting modem waste treatment facilities persists. NOPE-school
environmentalists may regard continued NIMBYism over new waste treatment
facilities as the best of all possible worlds, but the status quo poorly serves
communities at risk of further illegal dumping or the loss of hazardous waste-
producing industries. 5 Indeed, other environmentalists recognize that the local
siting impasse may simply displace the waste problem to poorer states or
countries. Long distance transportation may actually increase overall risk.156
The long-term availability of out-of-state sites, moreover, is not.guaranteed.
While the South Carolina legislature recently agreed to keep its Barnwell waste
facility open for another eighteen months in return for $90 million in fees,
public opinion surveys show strong popular support for shutting it down.'
57
Even when communities are compensated for accepting hazardous waste, a
growing number of observers contest the justice of imposing risks on people
with little economic or political leverage. 58
Thus the Massachusetts cities and towns that successfully fought off
hazardous waste sites may ultimately lose the NIMBY war. If the State does
muster the political will to implement a preemptive strategy, Massachusetts
communities will have little say in who bears the local costs of siting and how
much affected municipalities will be compensated. Alternatively, the State's
efforts may fail and municipalities will remain stuck in a recurring multi-party
game of prisoner's dilemma, thus blocking badly needed regional infrastructure.
This outcome is not only inefficient but immoral.5 9
155. In 1993 Governor Weld reiterated (largely in economic development terms) the need to break
the siting stalemate.
Massachusetts exports over 100,000 tons of hazardous waste each year, and has no in-state treatment
and disposal facilities for these wastes. As a result, Massachusetts businesses pay higher costs for
waste shipping and disposal than their counterparts in other states. Moreover, as other states seek
to limit imports of hazardous waste, waste management options to Massachusetts businesses may
become limited in the future. In addition, our state is viewed negatively by other states since we are
the fourth largest net exporter of hazardous waste, and we take no responsibility for managing it here.
Letter from William Weld, Governor of Massachusetts, to the MassachusettsHouse of Representativesand
Senate (Mar. 31, 1993) (accompanyingthe Governor's proposed H.R. 4815).
156. The Massachusetts Water Resource Authority will pay $1,250,000 a year simply to reserve space
in a Utah landfill for sewage sludge. Transportation costs will add to the expense. Scott Allen, Bay State
Ships Out Its Waste Problems, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 1994, at 20.
157. Id. Seventy-one percent of the state's residents want to close Barnwell to outsiders, even though
doing so would reduce waste fees. By contrast, residents of Barnwell itself are said to favor continued
operation. Unless Congress specifically authorizes states to bar or differentially tax the importation of waste,
such restrictions would violate the Commerce Clause.
158. See, e.g., Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning Approach to
Environmental Racism, I I VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495 (1992).
159. "To successfully loot society of its benefits without bearing its costs--in particular, by contriving
to live in an artificial Eden walled in by zoning laws and a willingness to picket and sue--is no victory, but
rather something to be ashamed of." MICHAEL O'HARE, RISK ANICIPATION AS SOCIAL COST IS (Lincoln Institute
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Is this the best we can do? Must we resign ourselves to the conclusion
that siting issues are not negotiable? The remainder of this Article argues that
a reconceptualized negotiation process can avoid the practical problems that
undermined the Massachusetts siting law. Indeed, in some cases, negotiation
has already provided a partial answer to NIMBYism.
A. Reframing the Negotiation Process
Negotiation is the best means for resolving the problem of siting hazardous
waste facilities. However, the negotiation process needs to be reframed. The
narrow economic view and focus on private compensation that shaped the
present statutory framework for negotiations reinforced communities' already
strong inclination to be self-regarding. Instead of leading the parties to the
bargaining table,-the use of economic incentives raised serious questions about
the legitimacy of the prescribed process and repeatedly triggered adversarial
behavior.
A different kind of negotiation can result from conceptualizing NIMBYism
not simply as market failure, but as a manifestation of traditional municipal
autonomy and widespread political alienation. 60 If NIMBYism is driven
predominantly by parochialism, then a solution must underscore community
interdependence and reciprocity. Further, to the extent that NIMBYism reflects
political alienation, siting policy must be fashioned more directly by those who
have to live with its consequences.
A redesigned negotiation process, instead of concentrating on the stalemate
between one facility developer and a particular community, should focus on
the regional siting deadlock among municipalities. By redefining the interested
parties and relevant issues, states could transform negotiation into an inter-
municipal treaty-making process in which communities determine their own
siting principles and standards. The central issue in this intermunicipal
negotiation would be: "How should we decide for ourselves an equitable
allocation of responsibility for activities we collectively need but which nobody
wants to host?"
Framing the problem in these terms could stimulate a very different kind
of public debate. Its key terms-"equitable," "responsibility," and most
important, "we"--resonate in a way different from that of "market failure,"
"inefficiency," and "compensation." A regional fair-share negotiation could
prompt dialogue over critical issues currently ignored: "If not here, then where?
If not this project for your neighborhood, then what other facility will you host?
And, if you will not do your share, why should others?"
of Land Policy, 1992) (footnote omitted).
160. See supra pp. 9-10.
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Such questions might prompt a wide range of NIMBY solutions, perhaps
including direct compensation for facility hosts. Moreover, other important
concerns would likely emerge. Should lemons and plums be paired, so that
communities hosting waste facilities are first in line for important benefits?
Alternatively, could a community that had done its fair share by accepting a
treatment plant obtain binding assurances that it would be exempt from other
regional responsibilities?
Cities and towns would still be expected to bargain hard so as to maximize
their own benefit and minimize cost, but such negotiation might be construc-
tively bounded by a greater sense of how their interests are intertwined. With
the negotiation process reoriented around regional responsibility, municipalities
would be encouraged to see themselves as part of a larger network of relation-
ships. New York City, with its disparate boroughs and neighborhoods, has suc-
cessfully fashioned a "fair share siting policy" to spread responsibility for its
prisons, AIDS-hospices, homeless shelters, and even waste treatment facilities
throughout the entire municipality.'61 Skeptics may doubt whether all public
and private decisions involved in the vast catalog of siting decisions can ever
be coordinated to achieve "fairness," or whether the general principle of
reciprocity can ever decide particular cases. Nevertheless, the mere existence
of the new policy casts the issues in a different light.
If affected communities could collectively agree on the need to break siting
deadlocks and allocate NIMBYs according to fair share principles, whatever
specific decisions that resulted would enjoy enhanced legitimacy. '62 Compliance
would undoubtedly improve if cities and towns were pushed to recognize their
interdependence. A community's temptation to oppose a particular project
would have to be balanced against jeopardizing what it stood to lose if the
larger bargain were to unravel. Under the existing Massachusetts system, by
contrast, a city that fights a proposed project does not violate any promises to
its neighbors, nor does it jeopardize reciprocal pledges.
A better negotiation process is just one part of the solution to the waste
facility siting problem. Better science, sounder projects, and more coherent state
policy are also necessary ingredients. Political leaders must recognize that the
absence of modern treatment facilities is costly for both business and the
environment. Nevertheless, even with better science, projects, and political
leadership, legitimate procedures will still be needed to determine who gets
burdened with what.
161. PILLER, supra note 4, at 193; see also Michael Dear, Understandingand Overcoming the NIMBY
Syndrome,58 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 288,293 (1992) (discussing fair share principlesas they apply to the siting
of human service facilities).
162. See generally Note, Zoning for Regional Welfare, 89 YALE L. J. 748 (1980). This analysis of
exclusionary zoning barriers to affordable housing easily could be extended to other regionally desirable,
but locally opposed, facilities.
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Could an intermunicipal negotiation actually be convened? Designing the
process raises a host of difficult legal, political, and ethical issues. Would all
municipalities in a state participate, or would economic or geographic con-
siderations justify different boundaries? Should we rely on existing regional
agencies and councils of government or are new fora needed to signal a clear
break from the past?'63 Who would speak for a community, and what would
constitute a binding agreement? Would a unanimity requirement give
communities an incentive to hold out for unfair advantage or to free ride?
Participants would surely realize that answers to such questions are not merely
procedural, but fundamentally determinative of bargaining power and political
identity.
B. Alternative Models of Regional Siting Negotiation
Explicit intermunicipal negotiation is not a mere flight of fancy; it already
operates successfully in a variety of forms. No single one of these forms may
be wholly appropriate for siting waste facilities, but collectively they offer a
set of diverse ways of thinking about and encouraging negotiation. This section
sketches three models of regional collaboration: special fora that allow
municipalities to coordinate regional policies; systems that allow communities
to reallocate regional mandates; and pooling arrangements whereby the costs
and benefits of development are more equitably shared.
Connecticut adopted the first approach-the creation of policy fora-in
1988 by enacting a statute authorizing the negotiation of "fair share housing
compacts" between central cities and their suburban neighbors. 6 4 In two pilot
regions, mayors or their designees hammered out agreements on regulatory
reform, increased investment, and other new programs intended to defeat
NIMBYism over low income housing. These agreements, in turn, were ratified
by 82 percent of the participating communities. Midway through the term of
the compacts, construction of new housing has actually been ahead of
schedule.' 65
163. In theory, the conventional legislative process should be a surrogate for an intermunicipal
convention, but the Massachusetts statute did not provide for any bargaining among the cities and towns
of the commonwealth. Given the choice between state preemption of local land use authority or a negotiated
approach, many legislators may well have viewed the latter as a safer vote, yet not have had any real
commitment to it. They could claim credit for taking action on a serious social problem, but at the same
time assume a hands-off attitude in particular cases because of the very nature of private developer-
community negotiation.
164. Wheeler, supra note 141.
165. "The staff and public officials who serve on the Capitol Region Council of Governments feel
that bringing 26 diverse communities together to negotiate and approve this Regional Housing Compact
is, in itself, a significant accomplishment." 1992 CAP. REGION COUNCIL OF GOV'TS FAIR HOUSING COMPACT ANN.




This effort would likely not have succeeded without legislative blessing.
State housing agencies and regional councils of government worked together
with independent mediators to create a setting in which communities could
recognize a shared interest in producing more affordable housing. The cities
and towns in both participating regions unanimously volunteered for the
process, undoubtedly contributing to its success. Unlike Massachusetts,
Connecticut did not mandate negotiation, nor did it threaten arbitration in the
event of impasse. There was heated debate on many issues, but parties were
freed from a need to position themselves for possible legal battles. As a result,
they were able to fashion solutions that met their various needs.
A second approach-the creation of a burden shifting system-is illustrated
by New Jersey's strikingly different response to similar housing issues. After
years of controversial litigation over local responsibility for housing, the State
legislature created an administrative agency to determine each municipality's
obligations. 6 Moreover, it authorized communities to lower their affordable
housing burden by up to one-half if they could persuade other municipalities
to absorb more than their quota.
Negotiations are wholly voluntary: a community that does not want to
accept more than its requirement can simply shut the door. This freedom not
only fosters a more constructive atmosphere, because no one is negotiating at
gunpoint, but may also relieve a community's worry that saying "yes" to one
LULU will make it more vulnerable to future projects.
The New Jersey law has been in place only half as long as the
Massachusetts siting statute, yet it has already prompted more than two dozen
successful negotiations, some involving transfer payments totaling more than
64 million dollars.167 A state agency serves as a clearinghouse and lubricates
the market with information, but the legislation does not prescribe a formal
negotiation process.
Like Massachusetts, New Jersey has deliberately created a market for
facilities that communities normally reject. The intended inducement in both
states, moreover, is negotiated compensation. Unlike Massachusetts, however,
New Jersey took a macro approach by stipulating a universal standard of
responsibility which communities then had some latitude to modify. In effect,
a State agency set the floor of obligation from which communities could
bargain. By requiring every municipality to meet at least half its originally
166. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 - 52:27D-328 (West 1986).
167. Harold A. McDougall,RegionalcCntributionAgreements:Compensationfor ExclusionaryZoning,
60 TEMP. L.Q. 665, 689 n.176 (1987). There have been successful affordable housing negotiations in
Massachusettsas well, though only on specific projects within a given community. Even if one municipality
were willing to pay another to accept its obligation, there is no legislative blessing of such transactions.
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stipulated obligation, the law underscores regional interdependence; no one city
or region gets stigmatized.' 68
A third regional approach-the use of pooling arrangements-may not
necessarily stimulate explicit negotiation, but it can dampen competitive
behavior among municipalities. Under special state legislation, ' cities and
towns in metropolitan Minneapolis/St. Paul share incremental property taxes
for new commercial and industrial development. A community that hosts a new
project gets a portion of its revenue, but the balance goes into a common
pool. 70 The system is intended to stop bidding wars between neighboring
communities that would otherwise compete for new projects by offering ever
fatter infrastructure and economic development incentives. Development still
yields new revenue for a host community, but other cities and towns
nonetheless share in the benefit.' 7'
The Minnesota system is a response to a very different kind of siting
problem, one in which communities are actively pursuing new facilities, not
opposing them.'72 However, a counterpart to the Minnesota system to facilitate
the siting of unattractive developments is not hard to imagine. All communities
in a region would be assessed a NIMBY tax, the proceeds of which would then
be used to compensate communities that agreed to take responsibility for
168. It is fair to ask whether the experiencesof Connecticut and New Jersey in intermunicipal negotia-
tions are applicable to the siting of hazardous facilities. Opposition to affordable housing can be bitter, but
hazardous waste may well rank higher on the hierarchy of NIMBY horrors.
There are more subtle problems, as well. Most communities can be persuaded to see a need for more
affordable housing. Even in high income suburbs there is typically concern about housing public employees
and the elderly. In New Jersey the state courts have clearly stated "fair share" principles, and although these
were controversial, they have become a distinct feature of the political landscape. By contrast, the sponsors
of the Massachusetts waste treatment process were only looking for a handful of sites. There was no
compelling reason why a facility should be placed in any particular community; however, the nature of the
technology and economics prevent dividing up the actual responsibility to all municipalities. One possible
solution to this problem of reciprocity would be to broaden the intermunicipal agenda to include other
environmental management and clean-up issues involving more communities. General linkage to state
investments and industrial policy might help in this regard as well.
169. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 473F.01-473F.13 (West 1977).
170. The host community gets 60 percent of the new revenue with the balance going into the common
pot. Steve Keefe, Twin Cities Federalism: The Politics of MetropolitanGovernance,in STATE AND REGIONAL
INITIATIVES FOR MANAGING DEVELOPMENT: POLICY ISsuES AND PRACTICAL CONCERNS 81,102 (Douglas C. Porter
ed., 1992).
171. The regional council sometimes serves as informal mediator and helps municipalities negotiate
side agreements when impacts from development in one community are felt by its neighbors.
The most common local system disputes occur, for example, when a proposed shopping center
would provide tax base to one community but result in traffic congestion and surface water
runoff in an adjacent community. In those circumstances, the council has helped work out
agreements that mitigate the immediate impacts on the adjacent community and that protect
the future rights of both communities to develop across the border from each other in a way
that balances impacts.
Id. at 103.
172. In fact, the regional system currently in place in Minnesota has not adequately resolved the





treatment plants, prisons, or other needed facilities.'73 A properly calilbrated tax
system might better reflect the overall benefits and costs of siting."4 Like the
Massachusetts siting strategy, such a tax arrangement would manipulate a
municipality's financial incentives, but would go significantly further by
symbolizing the interdependence of participating communities. Cities or towns
could decide for themselves whether they would rather pay into the pool-by
saying no to proposed LULUs-or draw funds out by saying yes.
A NIMBY tax might be just one element in a hybrid siting strategy. For
example, the imposition of such a tax might create a floor for intermunicipal
trades, just as the 'imposition of "fair-share" housing obligations has done in
New Jersey.'75 A regional forum on the Connecticut model might synthesize
an array of specific initiatives into an overarching siting policy.
Although structurally different, the strategies of Connecticut, New Jersey,
and Minnesota share three important attributes. First, each leaves municipalities
with significant authority and discretion; none of these states simply preempts
local land use power. 176 While the New Jersey and Minnesota laws create
obligations to provide affordable housing and to share new tax revenue
respectively, cities and towns can still accept or refuse specific projects. The
policies of the three states do not trump local power so much as coordinate its
exercise.
Second, each of the three strategies is legislatively authorized and
buttressed by new facilitating agencies. The enabling statutes address problems
of procedure, power, and legitimacy in somewhat different ways. The
Connecticut law, for example, defines who will sit at the bargaining table and
establishes a timetable for negotiation. The New Jersey statute shifts bargaining
power in favor of affordable housing developers and gives municipalities the
right to trade obligations. Minnesota's system fundamentally alters the taxing
173. See generallyMichelle J. White, Suburban Growth Controls: Liability Rules and Pigovian Taxes,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 207 (1979) (providing an economic analysis of such a system, in the context of zoning
issues).
174. Other analysts have suggested a lottery to determine which community would have to host a new
facility in return for a stipulated amount of compensation. Once the short straw was drawn, however, other
communities could "bid" to accept the facility for less. Howard Kunreuther & Paul Portney, Wheel of
Fortune:A Lottery/A uctionMechanismforSitingNoxiousFacilities, I17 J. ENERGY ENGINEERING 125(1991).
By contrast, the Massachusetts system was predicated on the hope that treatment fees would be large enough
to cover both profit and community compensation.
175. In much the same spirit of the tax system sketched here, Frank Popper has proposed a regional
point system that "would allow open trading of proposed LULUs between neighborhoods of a city, cities
in a region, or counties in a state." Popper, supra note 2, at 24. He believes that such a system would assure
communities that by accepting some facilities they would be spared others. Determining what kinds of
projects are commensurate would be a daunting task: how many trailer parks equal a coal-fired-power plant?
Perhaps even this could be negotiated out among the participating communities, although a tax system has
the virtue of fungibility.
176. In theory, regional preemption and centralized planning could moot NIMBYism, but as Frank
Popper has observed, this is seldom a realistic politically. "Every state is a home-rule state. Every state
will essentially remain so. Most federal or state attempts to preempt land use localism, to blunderbuss it
into the service of resolving LULU blockage, are likely to fail." Id. at 23-24 (footnote omitted).
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power of communities. Although the institutional tactics adopted in the three
states differ, they all serve to create new sets of regional relationships and
responsibilities. 177
Third, the three statutes all promote siting negotiation, albeit in intriguingly
different ways. Connecticut's law establishes a multilateral policy-making
forum, while New Jersey encourages bilateral deals between communities.
Minnesota's tax sharing formula changes each municipality's payoffs when it
seeks to woo private developers, thus dampening costly competition within the
metropolitan region. Yet a common central goal remains: the promotion of
rapid, equitable, mutually acceptable siting negotiation. In short, negotiation
of regional siting issues is alive and well, but in a variety of forms quite
distinct from the process attempted in Massachusetts.
C. Is Hazardous Waste Different?
Can procedural models designed for affordable housing and economic
development break NIMBY deadlocks over hazardous waste facilities? The
technical complexity and political volatility of waste issues are certainly
daunting. Yet recent experience in California offers at least some grounds for
optimism.
In the late 1970s California was under the same pressure as Massachusetts
to site new hazardous waste disposal and treatment facilities.' Local opposition
to proposed facilities was similarly fierce; legislative attempts to preempt local
land use authority were conclusively beaten back.'79 But in 1982 the California
legislature took a different tack with the creation of a broadly-based Hazardous
Waste Management Council.' Representatives from state and local
government, industry, environmental groups, and academia were given two
years to reach a consensual solution to the siting problem.'
The initial meetings of the Hazardous Waste Management Council saw
predictable posturing, but over time there was movement toward a shared
understanding of the issues."8 2 Agreement was eventually reached, in large part
because the Council broadened its agenda so that "[sliting per se was no longer
the priority, but only one (albeit important) option for the long-term
management of hazardous waste in the state."' 3  On the Council's
177. The current policy on military base closing-which involves an up-or-down vote on a wide
package of decisions-may also be instructive. Districts that are tempted to fight to spare their pet projects
now must balance the risk of jeopardizing all of the spending cuts. Packaging the cuts also tempers any
implication that one area has been singled out for sacrifice or retribution.
178. Mazmanian & Stanley-Jones, supra note 7, at 67.
179. Id.







recommendation, the legislature enacted a new law requiring counties to engage
in a similar consensus-building process to develop intercounty "fair-share" plans
that would meet waste treatment and disposal needs for at least a decade.
Whether concrete agreements can be reached at the county level is
uncertain, but the California effort is noteworthy in several respects. First,
consensus on state policy was reached by a broadly representative group, which
included local government officials."t 4 Second, the Council circumvented the
adversarial nature of conventional administrative processes by developing a set
of rules allowing participants to reframe issues, expand agendas, and devise new
solutions. "The forums foster an environment where leaders learn non-
adversarial modes of policy making and begin to view themselves as part of
a policy-making community . "..."185 Third, and probably as a result of this
cooperative atmosphere, the Council arrived at a "fair-share" principle that gives
fresh emphasis to responsibility and reciprocity.
Although California is still a long way from solving its waste problems,
it appears to have made a constructive start. In unhappy contrast, Massachusetts
is no closer to solving its NIMBY problem than in 1980 when the Hazardous
Waste Facility Siting Act was enacted. Indeed, the dismal history of the last
decade has led the political search for a credible policy to be all but abandoned
in favor of continued shipment out-of-state.
Conclusion: The Challenge for the Future
For all the conceptual imperfections of the Massachusetts siting law, it
possessed considerable virtues. The siting strategy broke important ground by
acknowledging the futility of state preemption of local land use control.
Moreover, although "compensation", "mitigation", and "linkage" are now
familiar terms in our political vocabulary,' in 1980 it was audacious to build
policy around the concepts they represent. Furthermore, the law wisely
addressed potential procedural obstacles to agreement by defining who would
serve on local assessment committees and authorizing these committees to bind
184. Notwithstanding the support of the Associated Industries of Massachusetts and the Environmental
Lobby, the consensus behind the Massachusetts siting statute proved illusory. Those groups represented
the interests of neither the communities that would have to bear the costs of hosting treatment facilities,
nor those who supposedly would benefit from a successful siting. As it happened, these lobbying organ-
izations avoided involvement in any of the subsequent proposals; although their interest in breaking the
NIMBY stalemate was genuine, the cost of being associated with any particular siting controversy apparently
was too great.
185. Mazmanian & Stanley-Jones, supra note 7, at 73-74.
186. That compensation is a mainstream notion was conclusively demonstrated by a 1993 episode of
The Simpsons in which the cartoon community of Springfield had to decide how to spend millions of dollars
received as reparations for illegal dumping of hazardous waste. (The townspeople squandered the money
on a shabby monorail project; Homer got to drive.) The Simpsons (Fox television broadcast, Jan. 21, 1993.)
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communities to agreement. The implementing regulations also foresaw possible
impasse; professional mediation was made available, although never used.
These positive elements should be components of any viable new strategy.
Unfortunately, the Massachusetts siting law's long record of failure will
probably deter policy makers from salvaging them. Indeed, its history may be
misread as proving that siting issues are nonnegotiable.' T
The Massachusetts siting policy defined negotiation too narrowly.
Specifically, a diagnosis of NIMBYism as market failure led to a correspon-
dingly cramped conception of negotiation as mere economic exchange between
developer and host community. The resulting policy exacerbated parochialism
instead of tempering it.
The obstacles to encouraging a different kind of negotiation are
considerable. But as long as cities and towns insist on their home rule
prerogatives, siting stalemates can only be broken by fostering regional
consensus on how local rights and responsibilities can be more equitably
exercised and respected. Such agreements must be negotiated by those who
must live with their consequences.
NIMBY controversies over waste facilities offer a rich and challenging
problem for negotiation scholars and practitioners. Such cases inevitably involve
many parties and issues. Stakeholders have few, if any, long-standing
relationships on which they can build, and little experience of public-private
negotiation. Even determining who sits at the bargaining table can prove
controversial. Technical complexity exacerbates friction: a wide variety of engi-
neering and public health issues must be addressed in the context of overlapping
(and sometimes contradictory) local, state, and federal environmental
regulations. Even experts can reasonably disagree about the appropriateness of
different solutions. Political heat is hard to dissipate. People care passionately
about the environment, the safety of their children, the value of their property,
the availability of jobs, and the strength of the tax base. Much is at stake sub-
stantively-how risks and benefits are distributed-and in terms of the political
implications of how decisions are made.
187. It is important to remember that only a handful of waste facilities have been sited anywhere in
the United States in recent years; it is hard to make a case that any particular state's process is demonstrably
superior. "Althoughoccasional new facilities have been sited in remote or highly industrial, thinly populated
locations in the Southwest, the consistent national pattern--of many different policies in many states-is
failure to succeed with this challenge. Siting processes based on command-and-control,engineeringanalysis,
and consensus mechanisms have all run aground on local opposition, even when statewide political
commitment to development of these facilities is strong." O'Hare & Sanderson, supra note 29, at 365.
It is worth noting that while Massachusetts was experiencing failure, Rhode Island enjoyed at least
one modest success with a similar process. The different outcome may be attributed to the small scale of
the project and the pronounced extent of prior illegal dumping. Richard J. Crenca, Little Warwick Makes
Hazardous Waste History, WASTE AGE, Mar. 1987, at 90.
Vol. 11:241, 1994
Negotiating NIMBYs
Hazardous waste problems are not simply economic, but also legal,
political, scientific, and ethical. NIMBY disputes will only be resolved through
a negotiation process that is designed and implemented to address all these
facets of the siting impasse.

